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Abstract: 
Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other 
innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and 
secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain 
are the primary cause of the problems. The illiquidity of asset and interbank markets, in this 
view, is a market failure derived from ill-designed mechanisms of coordinating financial 
intermediaries and investors. Thus, illiquidity is closely related to the design of the financial 
chains. Our policy conclusions emphasize crisis prevention rather than crisis management, 
and the objective is to restore a “comprehensive incentive alignment”. The toe-hold for 
strengthening regulation is surprisingly small. First, we emphasize the importance of equity 
piece retention for the long-term quality of the underlying asset pool. As a consequence, 
equity piece allocation needs to be publicly known, alleviating market pricing. Second, on a 
micro level, accountability of managers can be improved by compensation packages aiming at 
long term incentives, and penalizing policies with destabilizing effects on financial markets. 
Third, on a macro level, increased transparency relating to effective risk transfer, risk-related 
management compensation, and credible measurement of rating performance stabilizes the 
valuation of financial assets and, hence, improves the solvency of financial intermediaries. 
Fourth, financial intermediaries, whose risk is opaque, may be subjected to higher capital 
requirements. 
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1. Motivation and Introduction 
By now, the so-called Credit Crisis is more than a year old. In its course, the crisis has caused 
enormous casualties, forcing large international banks to write off hundreds of billions of dollars. 
While most of these losses were borne by private investors, namely bank shareholders, the state had 
to absorb considerable casualties as well, particularly in the US, the UK and in Germany. Bailouts 
were experienced in Germany (IKB, Sachsen LB), the UK (Northern Rock) and most dramatically 
in the US (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns, AIG and finally the huge $700 billion rescue 
package). Accumulated losses are estimated at more than $500 billion in September 2008 (Table 1) – 
this equals about 20% of the US budget or 3.6% of its GDP in 2007, or 18% of Germany’s 2007 
GDP. 
The epicenter of the crisis is well known to lie in the so-called sub-prime segment of the US housing 
market, where loan-to-value ratios had been raised over time, often exceeding 1. The cooling down 
of the US real estate market in the first half of 2007, sometimes characterized as the bursting of a 
housing price bubble, led to write-downs of the banks’ loan book. There were two major channels 
of contagion, one direct, the other more indirect, which shifted loan losses to investors. As to the 
direct channel of contagion, investors who had held chunks of these loan portfolios, for example in 
the form of tranches of securitized portfolios, experienced significant write-downs of their financial 
claims. Investors holding commercial paper were almost universally bailed out by the sponsoring 
banks or by the state if the former was in distress itself. Examples of loss-taking institutions are: 
Citibank, UBS, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, among many others.  
 
Table 1: Accumulated write-downs by regions in billion USD, Losses per Quarter and in total as of early September 
2008 (3Q 2008 – 3Q 2007), Source: DZ Bank Research Publication (2008) 
 
 
Firm  Total 3Q08 2Q08 1Q08 4Q07 3Q07 
Citigroup Inc.  55,1  0,5 11,7 19 18,2 5,7 
Merrill Lynch   52,2  6,1 9 9,7  18  10,6 
UBS 44,2  0  6  19,2  14,4  10,6 
HSBC  27,4 0  9,5 4,2 10 3,7 
Wachovia 22,7  0,3 13 4,4 3,2 1,8 
Table 2: Top five loss-taking institutions in billion USD, Write-downs per Quarter and in total as of early September 
2008 (3Q 2007 - 3Q 2007), Source: DZ Bank Research Publication (2008) 
Region  Total 3Q08 2Q08 1Q08 4Q07 3Q07 
Worldwide 516,3  18,1  115,1 168,0 167,9  47,2 
America 263,0  18,1  70,3 69,3 75,9 29,4 
Europe 229,5  0,0  41,3 89,3 81,3 17,6 
Asia 23,9  0,0  3,4 9,4  10,7  0,4   4
And then there is the indirect channel of contagion, following from the dramatic rise in CDS 
spreads and lending rates in the interbank market where lending rates reached record levels for an 
extended period, and markets became shallow. For some institutions, like Bear Stearns and 
Northern Rock in March 2008 and Lehman Brothers in September 2008, interbank lending became 
virtually impossible, experiencing a run on its reserves
1 at the same time. While Northern Rock was 
bailed out and Bear Stearns was taken over by JP Morgan Chase subsidized by the government, 
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.  This indirect channel mainly affected institutions with strong 
reliance on interbank lending, investment banks in particular. Extremely high levels of LIBOR over 
risk-free rates (see Figure 1) and an unprecedented small supply of funds in the interbank market 
forced banks to boost their liquidity reserves. The write-downs of their asset portfolios diminished 
the banks’ equity capital and forced them to raise capital from investors, including Sovereign Wealth 
Funds.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Spread between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month Treasury bills (TED spread, in percent) over the last 36 
months (3Q 2005 – 3Q 2008), Source: Bloomberg 
 
                                                 
1 On a single day, March 13, liquid assets of Bear Stearns shrank from $12.5 - to $2 billion, and credit lines were closed.   5
Furthermore, the break down of the interbank market urged Central Banks, notably the Fed, the 
Bank of England and the ECB, to provide ample access to liquidity for banks. While not being a bail 
out, the provision of large quantities of central bank lending facilities saved several large banks from 
becoming illiquid. These central bank interventions were initially intended to be of a short and 
transitory nature, but now such facilities have been extensively used for more than a year, and are 
still prolonged. In the course of these measures of liquidity assistance, some central banks are said to 
have taken huge stocks of low quality collateral on their books. 
The broad and extended loss of confidence among financial institutions, which has caused the 
break-down of the interbank market, is probably the most distinguishing characteristic of the current 
financial crisis. It also differentiates this event from many earlier episodes of financial market 
turmoil, as for instance the Asian or the Russian crisis (see Allen/Gale 2007 for a survey).  
Given the medley of terrifying headlines that filled the international newspapers over the past year, 
the call for new and stricter rules of bank supervision is all but surprising. For example, in the 
Report of the Financial Stability Forum (April 2008), and similarly in the Bank of England’s 
Financial Stability Report (April 2008), regulatory measures to restore the overall confidence of 
investors in the functioning of the global financial system are proposed. After September 15, the 
Black Monday, governments claim even more that the observed market failure needs to be cured 
through more regulation. Theses measures relate to (1) prudential oversight of capital, liquidity, and 
risk management, allowing for countercyclical capital adjustments
2; (2) improved transparency and 
regulation, facilitating the pricing and ensuring the tradability of complex financial instruments on 
secondary markets; (3) the rating process, stipulating different rating scales for structured and non-
structured products; and (4) the increase in sophistication of supervisors as far as risk control is 
concerned.  
In addition, the Bank of England has proposed to create a liquidity scheme, intended to break the 
adverse interaction (‘spiral’) between asset prices and balance sheets (see Bank of England 2008). 
This last point, in turn, is closely related to a proposed reform of the accounting standards, in an 
attempt to lower the suspected pro-cyclicality of the prevailing Basel II-capital standards
3.  
But is tighter regulation reasonable? History teaches us that changes in the regulatory framework are 
long-lived, and are very hard to adjust once in place. Also, history has many examples suggesting 
regulatory overreaction following financial crises, with Sarbanes-Oxley being a recent example (see 
                                                 
2 See also Kashyap/Rajan/Stein (2008) on this last point, emphasizing time-varying capital requirements, and state-
contingent capital infusion.  
3 See Goodhart/ Persaud (2008a) on this.    6
Coates 2007). Furthermore, the case for or against a particular regulatory action should be well 
founded in an economic analysis of the causes and determinants of the current crisis.  
Although we agree that the current situation witnesses a market failure, we first analyse its causes on 
the micro-level of financial intermediaries. We believe that incentives in banks and in financial value 
chains are at the core of the problem. Incentive misalignments tend to lower the quality of financial 
products, thus destabilizing asset valuation. Moreover, incentives misalignments tend to raise the 
leverage of financial intermediaries. Both effects undermine transparency about asset quality and risk 
positions of financial intermediaries. This cocktail inevitably destabilizes financial markets and the 
financial system. Therefore we argue that incentives need to be changed not only to align interests of 
managers and shareholders, but also to incentivize managers to preserve financial stability. These 
mechanisms can only be effective if there is enough transparency about financial assets and financial 
intermediaries. Intermediaries providing little transparency about their financial strength endanger 
financial stability and therefore should be required to provide higher equity capital.   
Drawing on recent academic literature, including our own research, we will try to provide a 
consistent description of what has happened in the market for structured finance. Knowing about 
the mechanics of structured finance is essential for understanding why it could happen that so many 
experts – economists, financial engineers, bankers – were caught by surprise when the crisis set on in 
the late spring of 2007. Equipped with this interpretation, we will discuss required action as we see 
it. More generally, we will discuss the promises as well as the limits for the future of securitization. 
2. What has happened? A brief recount 
The current crisis witnesses large amounts of distressed loans, in particular, mortgage backed loans. 
Such a situation is not new. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show, this type of crisis is reoccurring 
and appears to be related to economic downturns after boom phases. We do not ask what drives 
these repetitive crises. Instead, we ask what is new in the current crisis, and hope to find a first 
rough orientation relating to the future of securitization.  
The historical events leading up to the current crisis have been aptly described by several authors 
recently. Brunnermeier (2008) and BIS (2008) give a detailed account of major events leading to the 
current crisis. One may distinguish a build-up phase and then three waves of devaluations of bank 
assets. The build-up starts roughly in the mid-nineties when the financial technique of securitization 
is gradually applied to a wider set of asset classes ranging from real estate investments to car loans 
and credit card debt. Simultaneously, the design of ABS transactions became more complex, starting 
with straightforward issues and culminating in CDO
3 transactions with hard-to-replicate stochastic   7
properties. Over the entire build-up period, spreads on credit instruments remained stable and 
relatively low.  
Though there were early whistle blowers, for instance at the BIS in their annual reports since 2006, 
the first serious signs of a crisis appeared in July 2007, when two of Bear Stearns’ hedge funds got 
into trouble and had to be bailed out by the mother company, the investment bank. Only a few days 
later a first wave of devaluations struck the financial industry. Together with a decline of house 
prices in much of the US, refinancing became almost impossible for ABCP programmes. While 
there are now write-offs in many parts of the banking industry, the first institution to run into deep 
trouble is a European bank at the far end of the financing chain, IKB in Germany. Together with 
Sachsen Landesbank, these two over-exposed semi-state-owned institutions had to be bailed out, 
mostly by the German state. Soon thereafter, following a depositor run on the bank’s assets, a 
British retail mortgage bank who had copied the US subprime lending model, Northern Rock, was 
rescued and nationalized. 
The ensuing second phase of the crisis extends roughly one year from September 2007 until summer 
2008. Banks in the US, the UK, and in Europe were experiencing regular large quarterly asset write-
downs, particularly warehousing banks (Tables 1 and 2), while the interbank market almost 
completely dried out. Central banks intervene and open additional discount windows which grow 
over time to ever larger liquidity infusions. The infusions are accompanied by a rising volume of 
government paper issues, largely neutralizing the money supply. Simultaneously, investment banks 
around the world try to raise additional capital, which gives sovereign wealth funds from China and 
other Asian countries the opportunity to enter the market. However, the speed at which capital is 
eroding is not matched by the build-up of new capital.  
The third phase of the crisis starts in the summer 2008 when the worlds’ biggest private real estate 
financiers, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, have to be taken over by the state. The resulting additional 
problems in the interbank market swamp the investment banks which, one after the other, lose 
much of their market capitalization before they are either liquidated, taken over by a commercial 
bank, or transform themselves into a commercial bank. 
The three phases of the crisis, as of today, are accompanied by different reactions of regulators. 
While the regulators did not care much about securitization markets before summer 2007, they 
responded by selectively rescuing institutions like Bear Stearns, IKB and Northern Rock. Only in the 
second phase came the willingness to nationalize these institutions, in particular Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, intending to stabilize the market. In the third phase, still under way today, the 
nationalization of bad assets, rather than bad institutions is making its way ahead.    8
The steady intensification of state intervention, from selective bailout of institutions to 
comprehensive take-over of loss suffering assets, is a remarkable feature of this crisis. Opaqueness 
of financial markets and institutions is another unique feature. Investors obviously retreat from 
markets where asset or counterparty risk cannot be reasonably estimated. A third remarkable feature 
is the complete breakdown of interbank market – which gives central banks a big role to play, 
effectively substituting for the interbank market.  
3. Why did it happen? A perspective on costs and benefits of securitization 
3.1. Introduction   
In this subsection we use results from the academic literature on contract design in order to assess 
the contribution of asset securitization to market efficiency and (investor) welfare. Theory and 
evidence – the latter often scarce—are confronted. We demonstrate that some key assumptions of 
the textbook securitization model were effectively not met, and that the theory, therefore, was 
descriptively false. 
We find four key arguments requiring further discussion: (i) improved risk allocation: enhancing 
economy-wide risk sharing via contingent claims (achieving market completion); (ii) responsible 
disintermediation: preserving monitoring incentives in a lending relationship with market funding; 
(iii) low cost transparency of assets: disentangling information-sensitive and information-insensitive 
assets (creation of high-quality claims out of a pool of lower quality assets), (iv) transparency of 
financial intermediary risk stabilizing their funding. 
As a corollary to (ii) and (iii), we argue that secondary market liquidity of complex financial 
instruments is directly related to the reliability (accuracy and persistence) of announced asset quality 
which, in turn, is a function of responsible disintermediation.   
3.2 Risk transfer and diversification  
3.2.1 Theory 
Improving worldwide risk allocation and enhancing investor diversification are major benefits which 
securitization is said to achieve. By securitizing otherwise non-tradable assets, like credit card debt, 
corporate and consumer loans, the creditor can transfer asset risks to other financial intermediaries 
and private investors (households). Eventually risks are always borne by private investors, regardless 
whether risks are intermediated or not. Therefore a bank may retain some risks which, under normal 
market conditions, are effectively borne by its shareholders. However, securitized claims are easier to 
trade than loan portfolios, just like bonds are easier to trade than loans.    9
Another benefit of securitization derives from the fact that the underlying typically is a portfolio of 
claims rather than a single claim. Investing into a securitization tranche corresponds to buying a 
highly diversified claim. Therefore, no extra effort is needed to diversify individually, at presumably 
higher transaction costs. This benefit resembles the benefit realized by buying exchange traded funds 
instead of a large number of individual stocks. 
3.2.2 Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Global ABS issuance, Source: Bondware, Bloomberg, HSBC estimates 
The available empirical evidence in terms of market growth is consistent with the theoretical benefits 
mentioned before. Figure 2 is from HSBC, published on Dec 20, 2007. It portrays the strong 
worldwide growth in securitization issuance until 2006 indicating strong reallocation of default risks. 
Even though statistics on the allocation of securitization tranches are still rather incomplete, the 
available figures on write-downs of bank asset positions give some indication, see Table 1 and 2.  
These write-downs include all bank assets. They are not confined to securitization tranches, but 
include also loans, in particular, leveraged loans related to mergers and acquisitions. According to 
Table 1, at the beginning of September 2008, banks worldwide had written off $516 billion, 51% of 
which relate to US-banks, 45% to European banks and the rest to Asian banks. These figures 
indicate that at least European banks bought a large share of securitized risks and leveraged loans as 
the above theory on the gains of diversification would suggest. Moreover, previous crises in the US-
real estate sector were domestic, with little recognition in Europe and outside the US in general,   10
suggesting that securitization helped the current crisis to be spread around the world. Therefore, we 
conclude that securitization contributed to a broader worldwide risk allocation.  
The empirical evidence also supports the existence of strong diversification benefits.  Usually the 
mortgage-backed loans pooled in RMBS-transactions add up to a par value of at least $1 billion per 
transaction. Since a single loan typically does not exceed a par value of $1 million, more than 1000 
different residential mortgage-backed loans are pooled in a single transaction. The ensuing 
diversification benefit is very strong even though regional risk factors or loan type-risk factors (like 
subprime vs. other loan types) may be strong. Similarly, diversification is very good in credit card, 
auto loan and corporate loan securitizations, while it tends to be smaller in corporate bond 
transactions. In a study of 169 European securitizations, Franke, Herrmann and Weber (2007) find 
an average Moody’s diversity score of 88 for corporate loan securitizations, but only 45 for 
corporate bond securitizations.    
3.3 Risk transfer and asymmetric information 
The benefits of securitization stated in the previous subsection come at a cost, however. The cost is 
related to the problems implied by information asymmetries. Securitization is a technology which 
attempts to handle the inherent conflict between efficient decision making and optimal worldwide 
risk allocation. Efficient decisions are supported if the decision maker has to bear all the 
consequences of her decision. This is typical of the bank-based model in which a bank takes the 
lending decision and retains the loan on its book until maturity foregoing benefits from improved 
risk allocation. In the market-based model the bank takes the lending decision, but transfers the risks 
to others. Thus, risk allocation is improved, but decision making is no longer efficient. The latter 
follows because in a world of asymmetric information the bank inevitably tries to benefit from 
adverse selection and moral hazard rendering its decisions second best. Securitization combines the 
bank and the market based model in order to use its strength avoiding its weaknesses. So far the 
empirical evidence puts large question marks to this model. 
Securitization is one way to use the screening technology of an originator without being constrained 
by her ability to generate capital on her own balance sheet. Therefore, securitization facilitates the 
specialization among financial intermediaries. It may increase the scale of operations of these 
institutions, and at the same time it broadens the investor base willing to fund these assets directly 
rather than via bank deposits or bank bonds, and to bear the accompanying risk. To the extent that 
securitization leads to better risk allocation and to more investors entering capital markets, potential 
welfare benefits arise.    11
However, securitization raises agency problems on various levels. First, there is a conflict between 
the originating bank and investors buying securitization tranches. Second, there are additional 
conflicts if loan origination and servicing is not concentrated in the bank, but split into several 
specialized jobs which are delegated to various agents in a value chain. Third, there is an agency 
problem between the bank manager and the bank shareholders. Fourth, bank shareholders may also 
be interested in bank policies which benefit them at the expense of financial stability. We will 
address these problems step by step. 
3.3.1 Two-tier agency relationships: Theory  
If all activities of securitization are concentrated in one bank, then borrowers, the bank and 
investors are involved. We address the agency conflict between the bank and investors. Information 
asymmetries between lending banks and investors in securitization tranches motivate adverse 
selection and moral hazard. This is a typical agency problem. The lending bank grants the loans and 
transfers the risk to investors. The bank has a strong incentive to overstate the quality of the loans 
so as to buy protection at lower cost. More importantly, a quality deterioration of loans as in the 
subprime crisis which is neither fully recognized by investors nor by the rating agencies, leads to 
downward biased credit spreads on securitization tranches. As long as the credit spreads on the 
underlying loans correctly reflect the loan quality, securitization profits are upward biased. This 
improves the originator´s opportunities for adverse selection. More generally, mispricing in one 
market may create opportunities for adverse selection in risk transfer. Gorton (2008) points to 
product complexity as another reason for adverse selection. The seller understands the product, but 
the buyer does not and pays too much. 
Besides adverse selection the bank being the servicer of the loans is subject to moral hazard. Once 
the default risk is transferred, the bank has little incentive to monitor the obligors and potentially 
restructure the loans so as to reduce the default risk. From standard agency theory, the conflict 
between the principal and the agent is resolved in a second best solution in which the agent bears 
some of the default risk through her income which is inversely related to the defaults. The share of 
the risk held by the agent trades off monitoring effort and risk sharing. Thereby the interests of the 
principal and the agent are partially aligned. 
In securitization transactions, the ‘magic’ trick of incentive alignment is achieved by a contractual 
device which is very familiar from insurance contracts, i.e. a deductible
4. Of all the issued tranches 
                                                 
4 Despite its self-contained terminology, the contractual design in structured finance is largely identical of what has been 
practiced in the reinsurance industry during centuries. Non-proportional reinsurance in the form of aggregate excess loss 
leads to similar payoff patterns as observed in a ABS or CDO issue.  For an early description see Kopf (1929). Doherty 
(2005) discusses alternative ways and means to align incentives.  The optimality of deductibles is shown in Arrow (1971).   12
with different priority, the lowest ranked tranche is supposed to be retained by the issuer. This note 
is called the first loss piece, or the equity tranche. By construction, the first loss piece fully absorbs 
all default losses up to its notional amount. In most practical cases, this implies that the first loss 
piece will have lost much of its face value before the bond matures, explaining its widespread 
characterization as ‘toxic waste’. If the bank fully retains the first loss piece, then it retains most of 
the default risk. This strongly mitigates information asymmetry problems, but it also strongly limits 
the risk transfer and hence is a strong barrier to optimal risk allocation. Agency theory, however, 
does not require the bank to fully retain the first loss piece. As in insurance contracts, the insured 
may retain a deductible of, for example, 20% of the damage, up to a given limit. This may be 
sufficient to effectively constrain moral hazard. Similarly, if the bank retains, say 20% of the first loss 
piece, this may be sufficient to effectively constrain adverse selection and moral hazard. Whether 
this is true or not, is an empirical issue.  
Securitization not only tranches the underlying portfolio into a first loss piece and a rest, instead it 
splits the rest into several tranches according to strict subordination. The basic technique used in 
securitization consists of pooling the payment stream of a given asset pool and routing these cash 
flows to different classes of bonds, called tranches, so as to offer a wide variety of claims of different 
qualities. This enables different groups of investors to buy those claims which fit their needs best. 
Strict subordination implies: Investors buying part of the lowest tranche, the first loss piece,  will 
only receive payments after all other investors buying more senior tranches have fully received their 
interest and principal claims. Similarly, a mezzanine tranche will receive payments only after all more 
senior tranches have been fully served, and so on until the highest, most senior tranche which will be 
served before all other tranches.  
However, the first to be served is the originating bank. It gets fees for arranging and servicing. Often 
this bank also is the swap counterparty for the special purpose vehicle, allowing it to collect 
additional fees hidden in the swap terms. Therefore the originating bank has a first profit position. 
This position is a super-senior position and, hence, almost risk-free. To illustrate the first profit 
position, consider a true sale transaction. Usually the market value of the underlying portfolio 
exceeds the par value by some percentage points. But the par values of all tranches together never 
exceed the par value of the underlying portfolio. The surplus is translated into the first profit 
position. It motivates the originator to expand the transaction volume so as to generate higher 
profits, irrespective of default risk. The super-seniority of the first profit position creates another 
wedge between the originator and investors./Krahnen   13
The properties of pooling and tranching have been analyzed in the security design literature, in 
particular by Greenbaum/Thakor (1987), Duffie and DeMarzo (1999), Plantin (2003), DeMarzo 
(2005), Franke/Krahnen (2006). These papers show that under certain conditions relating to 
information distribution, risk management capacity and risk aversion, tranching can emerge as an 
optimal contractual device to allocate cash flows. In particular, tranching allows for incentive 
alignment when the underlying assets are subject to moral hazard or adverse selection. 
Securitization, thus, should optimally trade-off the costs and benefits of an improved risk allocation 
among the agents in the economy. 
As argued above, agency theory tells us that the party affecting the level of default losses through its 
activities should bear a substantial portion of these losses. Hence the originating bank should retain 
a substantial part of the first loss piece. Mezzanine tranches often carry below investment grade 
ratings because their default probability is substantial. In Plantin (2003), mezzanine tranches are 
marketed to sophisticated investors, i.e. investors with a comparatively high monitoring capability. 
The reason is that the buyers of mezzanine tranches face a substantial probability of being hit by 
default losses before the bond matures, implying the need to take over the monitoring task from the 
holder of the first loss piece. Once the first loss piece is completely absorbed, the mezzanine 
tranches are effectively taking over the role of the most junior claim. Since the task of monitoring 
requires special expertise, mezzanine note holders are likely to be sophisticated investors, like fellow 
investment banks or hedge funds, effectively shielding senior tranche holders from the cost of 
incentive misalignment, i.e. from a further decrease in asset quality, see also Franke/Krahnen (2006).  
This brings us to another hypothesized contribution of securitization to welfare, namely the creation 
of information-insensitive senior tranches. More precisely, senior tranches are information-
insensitive in the sense that their payoff strongly depends on macroeconomic tail risk, not on 
idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk
5. This allows remote investors like households or pension funds to 
directly fund the asset pool without having to worry about firm-specific information or the 
monitoring of the originating bank. Information-insensitive tranches require no expertise of buyers 
in risk management and, thus, are well suited for remote investors. Information-sensitive tranches, 
however, should be purchased by sophisticated investors. This benefit of strict subordination should 
clearly contribute to welfare gains achieved by securitization. Therefore, theory predicts substantial 
first loss piece retention by the originating bank in a typical securitization transaction, while 
                                                 
5 On a more general level, securitization may be interpreted as completing the market, since the tranches issued in the 
process of securitization are non-proportional claims on the underlying risk. Their payoffs are macro factor dependent, 
therefore securitization may be seen as a technique to create state contingent claims. Investors buy notes carrying 
predominantly tail risk characteristics. Such securities are called senior bonds, and in today’s markets a large fraction of 
these bonds carry a standardized risk load, rated triple A, signalling a very low expected default probability.  
   14
mezzanine tranches are held by sophisticated investors and the most senior tranches are held by 
remote investors. 
Information insensitivity of senior tranches is also of great relevance to the emergence of a 
secondary market for such instruments. With insensitivity to firm-level information, notes can be 
traded among investors essentially without recourse to firm-level information, and therefore without 
fear of adverse selection and moral hazard. This reduces the information cost of traders and 
stabilizes the market values of senior tranches.  
Summarizing, apart from the benefits of improved risk allocation we find three characteristics of 
securitization transactions that are potentially relevant for valuation of these instruments. First, 
incentive alignment between originator and investor is achieved through an adequate level of 
recourse, typically through retention of the equity piece
6. Second, incentive alignment is further 
secured by mezzanine investors, since they are potentially substituting for the holders of the equity 
tranche if portfolio losses reach higher levels. That is why mezzanine tranches are held by 
sophisticated investors. Third, senior tranches are exposed to systematic tail risk only, making these 
notes an ideal asset class for non-informed investors, like households, pension funds.  
Predictions regarding the originating bank are threefold. First, securitization allows banks to transfer 
tail risk from bank balance sheets to investors outside the financial sector, relying on senior tranches. 
Second, securitization will not lead to unlimited risk transfer, as equity tranches tend to be retained.  
This is also in the interest of the bank because it reduces the cost of buying protection. Third, if a 
bank transfers part of its loan risk to the capital market, this enables the bank to take new risks. It 
may even induce more risk taking of the bank if investors are not aware of it or if more risk taking 
allows the bank to benefit more from adverse selection and moral hazard. 
3.3.2 Two-tier agency relationships: Evidence 
Eventually risks have to be borne by individuals. In an intermediated world risks are borne to some 
extent by the intermediaries. But given the substantial costs of intermediary insolvency, their 
insolvency risk should be strongly constrained. Securitization of bank loans is considered to be one 
mechanism of reducing intermediary insolvency risk because the lending bank would transfer at least 
part of the loan default risk to other players. Whether securitization achieves this objective, depends 
on various effects: First, to what extent are default risks transferred in securitization transactions? 
Second, does the risk transfer in securitizations reduce or increase the overall risks taken by 
                                                 
6 This presupposes that the equity piece is large enough to cover a suitable quintile of the loss distribution. There are 
functionally equivalent alternatives to equity piece retention, like contractually specified conditional recourse.   15
securitizing banks? Third, does the risk transfer in securitizations undermine the quality of bank 
lending? Fourth, does this risk transfer render risk allocation in financial markets more opaque? The 
last two questions will be dealt with in the following subsections. 
First, we analyse the size and the allocation of the first loss piece. In a sample of 40 European 
securitization transactions, Franke and Krahnen (2006) find that in most transactions, the FLP 
covers a quintile of more than 85% of the portfolio loss rate distribution
7. Of course, this number 
strongly depends on the ratings assigned to the underlying asset pools by the rating agencies as well 
as on the default correlations assumed in the simulations. We use similar correlations as the rating 
agencies. Given this high loss absorption by the first loss piece (FLP), forcing the arranger to fully 
retain it, would mostly eliminate the default risk transfer. But full retention is not necessary as argued 
above. Nevertheless, we might expect the originator to retain a portion of 15 to 25%. If investors 
know the retained portion, then they can condition their expectations on these incentives and obtain 
more accurate estimates of their default risk.    
Surprisingly, however, the allocation of risks in securitization transactions is one of the well guarded 
secrecies of the industry. Originating banks never appear to commit in public to retaining a certain 
fraction of the FLP. Maybe, they consider it important to maintain freedom in changing their 
position in the FLP over time. Maybe, originators expect some investors to believe naively that they 
retain a large fraction. So they may be afraid to disappoint these investors by announcing low 
fractions. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence indicates that smart investors only buy rated 
tranches if the originator promises to retain some minimum fraction of the FLP. Particularly in the 
year before the outbreak of the subprime crisis, anecdotal evidence showed an increasing number of 
transactions being issued with no retention of the first loss
8. Of course, even if the FLP is sold 
completely, the originator retains the almost risk-free first profit position. Although some servicer 
fees may be declared in the offering circular, investors know little about the size of the first profit 
position. 
                                                 
7 Further studies that confirm the extreme riskiness of the first loss piece are Haensel/Krahnen (2007) and Franke, 
Herrmann and Weber (2007). Both studies find that the FLP bears, on average, between 80% and 90% of the expected 
default losses of the securitized portfolios. These numbers are derived from replicating the loss rate distribution of the 
underlying asset portfolios, since the allocation of expected losses to individual tranches is not public information. 
Furthermore, these numbers cannot be used to gauge effective risk transfer, since this depends on whether a tranche is 
retained by the issuer.  
8 We have no hard evidence to back up this claim, as we rely on reports from managers in the industry in private 
conversations.    16
Buyers of the FLP-risk presumably are mostly banks and, to a smaller extent, hedge funds and 
insurance companies
9. A BIS-study of 2008 notes, based on surveys conducted by the Basel 
institution among leading international banks, that equity tranches were predominantly acquired by 
asset managers (serving as arrangers), active traders and institutional investors (p. 18).  Retention is 
not even mentioned here. Again, even though the empirical evidence is quite limited, the theoretical 
prediction that the originator mostly retains a substantial fraction of the FLP is very likely wrong. 
This FLP-risk transfer conjecture is supplemented by the suspicion concerning the transfer of rated 
tranches, mezzanine and senior. Originators do not inform the public about their sale of rated 
tranches. This makes it difficult for the outsider to estimate the risk of the underlying portfolio kept 
by the originator on its book. The naive view that the rated tranches are mostly sold to outsiders has 
been questioned, too. Citibank assumes most AAA-tranches to be retained within the banking 
sector. According to Citibank (2007), banks bought about 30% of the AAA-tranches, SIVs and 
conduits about 20% and money market funds about 25%, adding up to 75%. The BIS study also 
argues that over the past few years, issuers have increasingly retained the senior and super-senior 
tranches. Also monoline insurers have taken on a considerable share of senior risk (see BIS 2008, p. 
17), curtailing the risk transfer to remote investors.  
Even though the risk of money market funds is, in legal terms, borne by the buyers of these funds, 
the issuing banks can effectively not impose substantial losses on them since money market 
investments are perceived as almost risk free investments. And rightly so, issuers of money market 
funds typically extend liquidity guarantees to these funds which, in the event of prolonged illiquidity, 
imply fund buyers to hold a put option against the issuer. Therefore banks appear to hold most of 
the AAA-risk.  
This is also supported by the very restricted evidence regarding synthetic securitization transactions. 
Franke/Herrmann and Weber (2006) find that in synthetic transactions the non-securitized AAA-
portion exceeds 80% of the par value of the transaction. Casual talks with bankers indicate that a 
large part of this non-securitized risk is not insured through senior credit default swaps and, hence, 
borne by the originator. This is somewhat inconsistent with the BIS-study mentioned earlier and 
Lehman Brothers
10, arguing that monoline insurers have taken on a considerable share of senior risk. 
The rationale behind the bankers’ reluctance to insure the senior risk is probably that the default 
probability of AAA-tranches is very small so that buying insurance appears too costly. Also, the low 
                                                 
9 According to the Credit Derivatives Report of the British Bankers Association, in the credit default derivatives market 
of 2006, banks sold 59 % of the default risk while they bought 44 %. Hedge funds sold 28 % and bought 32 %, 
insurance companies sold 6 % and bought 17 %. 
10 Graph displayed in Gorton 2007, p. 43.   17
risk weight attached by Basel II to AAA-tranches does not motivate originating banks to transfer 
this risk. Therefore we conclude that also the second theoretical prediction claiming that the most 
senior tranches are held by remote investors is wrong.  
Summarizing, it appears that originators sell a large part of the FLP in the first place to other banks 
and, in the second place, to insurance companies and hedge funds. A large portion of the large 
AAA-tranches is retained in the banking sector. The proportion of default risk in securitizations 
retained by the originating banks is not publicly known. We conclude that the observed risk transfer 
is quite different from what theory (and the common pre-crisis understanding) predicts. That is why 
we label the risk transfer story a myth. 
3.3.3 Multi-tier agency relationships 
So far we analysed securitization starting from a bank, which concentrates all bank activities in-
house. Industry has outsourced many parts of the production process so as to reduce production 
costs and benefit from specialized skills and innovations of their suppliers.  Banks also started 
outsourcing various parts of the production process. This is apparent in the subprime crisis. This led 
to a replacement of two-tier agency relationships to multi-tier agency relationships. Ashcroft and 
Schuermann (2008) discuss in much detail the various parties involved in the securitization of 
subprime loans. They also analyse the various agency problems induced by this division of banking 
activities and mechanisms to mitigate these agency problems. The parties involved in managing the 
subprime business form a value chain of highly specialized parties, each having its own interests and 
its own manager. The benefits of specialization are indisputable. The agency costs of the value chain 
are difficult to estimate. The important question is whether a coordination mechanism can be 
designed for the involved parties to assure sufficient quality of the overall product. Part of this 
coordination mechanism is the incentive system. 
First, have a look at the value chain in mortgage lending. In the subprime business, the originators of 
mortgage backed loans and the mortgage brokers cooperating with them are involved mostly in the 
beginning. Once the loans are contracted, originators are no longer involved, subject to the rule that 
they may have to repurchase loans not properly contracted or loans if the debtor fails to pay within a 
limited time period after contracting. Hence originators and mortgage brokers tend to have a short 
term perspective. Their reward mostly depends on the loan volume they contract, but not on the 
long term loan performance. This is rational in the sense that they have no influence on the handling 
of the loans by other parties later on. Thus, they desire protection against agency behavior of agents 
involved later on. But this also implies that hidden characteristics of the loans induced by non-
observable behavior of originators and mortgage-brokers which may show up much later do not   18
matter for their reward. Therefore they tend to raise the volume of loans, but also to reinforce 
adverse hidden quality-characteristics.  
Another party involved is the warehouse lender which initially funds the loans. It may have some 
influence on the choice and the activities of the originator, but not on the choice and the activities of 
the servicer. Hence, the warehouse lender prefers a reward independent of the servicer actions.  
The servicer of the loans is responsible for collecting interest and principal payments, for making 
sure that the real estate on which the mortgage is written, is kept in good shape and for potential 
action in case of delinquency or default. As pointed out by Ashcroft and Schuermann (2008), the 
servicer collects servicing fees until default so that she has a strong incentive to defer default 
through restructuring the loan even though this may raise default losses. As argued by Moody’s, the 
quality of the servicer may have a strong impact on the foreclosure value. Not surprising, the 
originator does not want a reward which depends on the servicer quality on which he has no 
influence. Similarly, the servicer has no influence on the choice of the originator and therefore does 
not like a reward depending on the originator quality.  
The only party involved throughout the securitization process is the arranger. She sets up a special 
purpose vehicle for securitizing loans and mostly manages it. Therefore she is in the best position to 
coordinate and monitor the activities of all parties involved.  The SPV buys the loans and securitizes 
them. Tranches are sold to investors who usually have little information on the underlying assets. 
They may rely on the ratings of rating agencies and, in addition, on the advice provided by 
investment managers. While rating agencies are also involved long term in the transaction through 
monitoring and adjusting ratings, investment managers are mostly involved at the start of the SPV 
when the loan portfolio of the SPV is composed. Later on the portfolio may be adjusted again using 
the advice of the same or other investment managers. Rating agencies and investment managers do 
not have a financial stake in the transaction. But their reputation is at stake.  
As pointed out by Ashcroft and Schuermann (2008), the cooperating parties set up rules to 
safeguard the quality of the transaction. If these rules are violated, then the negligent party may have 
to pay the damage. But this liability is subject to a time horizon. Also the negligent party may restrict 
its potential payments by limited liability and low equity capital. Moreover, often it is difficult to 
prove negligent behavior so that the negligent party may escape recourse. Hence default losses 
which could have been avoided by careful behavior may be imposed on other parties, in particular 
investors. Of course, investors anticipate that and charge a premium. But they are exposed to a high 
level of operational risk with so many parties being involved. Effective coordination of these parties 
appears to be very difficult.   19
Can these problems be resolved by incentive systems? Standard theory suggests that, in the absence 
of asymmetric information and agency problems, all parties should take a share in the overall risk
11. 
The share a party takes increases with its wealth. This simple allocation is no longer optimal if 
parties have different expectations and affect the overall risk by different activities which are only 
partially or not all observable by the other parties. Ceteris paribus, from standard agency theory, the 
stronger is the influence of some party on the overall risk, the more risk it should bear.  
If, for example, the originator has a strong influence through her screening activities, then she 
should bear a relatively high share of the risk. But there are two counterarguments. First, she has 
little control of the other parties involved in the transaction. This should reduce her risk share. 
Second, the parties are involved in the transaction in different time phases. The originator is 
involved only at the beginning. She has no control over the transaction later on. Hence, as argued 
before, she desires protection against agency behavior of the other parties, for example through 
reducing her risk share over time. This would be even more efficient if the effects of her own 
conduct would show up early in the transaction so that she would bear more of the consequences of 
her behavior in the early years in which her risk share is relatively high.  
If, however, the consequences become visible only in later years, then her risk share should decline 
at a slower rate exposing her more to agency problems induced by other parties. Similarly, 
warehouse lenders are involved with their funding activities only for short while. Asset managers 
may be replaced, reducing their time horizon, too. Hence constant long term risk sharing of these 
parties appears inefficient. Also, long term risk sharing would necessitate long term risk management 
which is not the core business of these parties.  
This explains why we do not observe long term financial stakes of various parties. To some extent 
these problems might be mitigated through reputation effects, but we are sceptical about these. 
Given these difficulties, a way out could be to give the arranger a very prominent role in setting up 
the transaction, choosing and monitoring other parties. Then her strong role should be incentivized 
by a long term financial stake bearing a substantial part of the default losses. She could do this by 
retaining a substantial part of the First Loss Piece. But the empirical evidence shows that arrangers 
are reluctant to retain substantial parts of this toxic waste piece. In recent years, as has been pointed 
out before, in some cases the arrangers sold the First Loss Piece completely. Hence this incentive 
mechanism clearly failed in these cases.   
                                                 
11 More precisely, if all parties have homogeneous expectations and time additive-utility functions belonging to the class 
of functions with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion with the same exponent, then all parties would buy a share in the 
overall market risk.   20
The previous discussion raises a general question: How many parties in the value chain are desirable? 
There is a trade-off between the cost advantage of outsourcing parts of the production process to 
specialized parties and the corresponding agency costs. The function relating the cost advantage to 
the number of specialized parties should increase at a declining rate (diseconomies of specialization). 
The function relating the agency cost to the number of specialized parties should also increase. But 
we do not know whether it increases at a constant, declining or increasing rate. If n denotes the 
number of parties, then the number of bilateral agency relationships, n(n-1)/2, increases 
disproportionally. This might indicate that agency costs also rise disproportionally. So far we lack 
empirical evidence. The view of Ashcroft and Schuermann (2008) that agency problems can be 
reasonably resolved at each bilateral stage appears quite optimistic. Their view is partly based on 
reputation cost arguments. Similarly, Gorton (2007) argues that implicit contracts between 
originators and other involved parties align interests. Presumably, he also refers to reputation 
mechanisms. We doubt this, given the evidence on the deterioration of mortgage backed loan 
quality. 
Based on casual evidence, there are some banks which have fully separated different stages in the 
lending process from each other. For example, one German bank has established an internal pricing 
scheme according to which loan origination is compensated by a flat fee, while all loan cash flows 
(i.e. return and risk) are transferred to a Credit Risk Unit, which sets loan rates, and which decides 
whether a particular loan is sold, securitized, or kept on the books. This system leaves the incentive 
alignment between originating and processing unit unresolved.  
Two implications emerge. First, it does not make sense to maximize benefits from specialisation of 
parties. A standard model for securitization might be to have one party for both, arranging and 
servicing. Both activities are long term and, thus, can be coordinated by one party without conflicts 
of different time horizons. If loan origination is outsourced, then the arranger having also the 
information from servicing could monitor originators more effectively. It might be better, however, 
if some of the origination is also done by the arranger-servicer. Then she would have more updated 
information on origination which she can also use for more effective monitoring of other 
originators. This benefit might outweigh the foregone cost benefit of complete outsourcing.  
Second, there should be a trade-off between outsourcing activities in a more extended value chain 
and the retention of default risk by the transaction coordinator. The more activities are outsourced, 
the more problems emerge from information asymmetries, the more effectively investors should be 
protected against negligent behavior of parties. Regarding the FLP, the arranger should commit to 
retain a larger fraction of the FLP if the value chain is extended. This would clearly demonstrate a   21
trade-off of risk and return of outsourcing for the arranger. If she extends the value chain, she 
would benefit from cost savings. At the same time, she would have to take a higher default risk 
discouraging her from imposing more agency costs on investors. 
Apart from the difficulty of maintaining comprehensive incentive alignment all along the value 
chain, a further issue of non-integrated (out-sourced) business processes is credibility in the market. 
Effective coordination of the different parties of a value chain appears to be a requirement for 
financial stability because otherwise some parties may not worry about risks. This may lead to 
excessive risks imposed on others like investors who suddenly retreat from the market once they 
learn about this failure. As a consequence, markets break down triggering a crisis. For illustration, 
part of the subprime crisis is often related to the role of originators and mortgage brokers. If they 
are rewarded independently of the default risk of the contracted loans, then this clearly violates 
conditions for effective value chain coordination. 
3.4 Compensation and incentives  
Risk transfer and the conservation of lending relationships are conflicting objectives. This is in 
particular true for financial assets, where the random terminal value is sensitive to moral hazard and 
adverse selection. While the previous sections focussed on agency conflicts between different legal 
entities, we now discuss agency conflicts between managers and shareholders of a bank to get an 
understanding about potential reasons for excessive risk-taking. In the current section we turn to 
management compensation as a possible source of conflict. The focus is on the sharing of risks 
between the manager, shareholders and third parties and on the term structures of payoffs to these 
different parties. The purpose of this exercise is to show that certain manager compensation 
schemes may incentivize the bank manager to choose a very risky bank portfolio. This is not 
necessarily in conflict with shareholder value maximization, but it may endanger financial stability. 
Therefore, it is not sufficient to look at managers and shareholders, but also default probabilities of 
banks are essential as a proxy for costs imposed on the financial system. 
There are four major results in this section. First, if the bonus is backend-loaded, e.g. based on the 
bank’s terminal value, then there is no or little conflict of interest between management and 
shareholders
12. Yet, the probability of bankruptcy may be substantial. Second, if the bonus is 
frontend-loaded, e.g. based on the present value of expected profits instead on market values, then 
the management decision clearly differs from shareholder preferences. Third, if the manager gets a 
bonus annually, then her preferred asset quality strongly depends on the compensation package. 
Fourth, the manager has a strong incentive for high bank leverage if the bonus is nonnegative and 
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the profit for bonus does not include a penalty for high leverage. Therefore it is essential to replace 
the bonus system by a bonus/malus system so as to discourage the manager from very strong risk 
taking. This is even true if shareholders also benefit from high risk taking because it may endanger 
financial stability as well. A malus system needs to be carefully designed so as to hinder the manager 
to undercut the malus by her bank policy, similar to undercutting bank regulation by regulatory 
arbitrage. 
Before presenting a numerical example, linked to securitization, we mention that there is a large 
literature on manager compensation and risk taking. On the theoretical side, Ross (2004) 
demonstrates that conventional wisdom may be misleading. He shows that, for example, the 
conventional wisdom that stock options motivate the manager to raise business risks may be wrong. 
Nonlinear compensation structures induce three different conflicting effects on risk taking so that 
general statements cannot be made (see also Lewellen 2006). On the empirical side, Jin (2002) finds 
that performance dependent incentive levels for CEOs tend to move inversely to the systematic and 
non-systematic business risk if the CEOs face hedging constraints. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) 
find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) induces the CEO to implement 
riskier business policies. They also find a positive impact of business risk on the Vega of the CEO 
compensation.  A more detailed analysis of dynamic risk taking of hedge fund managers is provided 
by Hodder and Jackwerth (2007). They show in a simulation model that hedge fund managers tend 
to take very high risk when the fund value is close to the high water mark. 
The public discussion on incentives in bank management starts from the observation that today 
bank managers are strongly incentivized by bonus systems and that this may induce them to take 
excessive risks. We take a closer look at these incentive systems and ask what could be done to 
mitigate induced problems of risk taking. To start with a few examples, taken from annual reports, 
top management is often compensated by a package of (1) a base salary, (2) a cash bonus based on 
results of 2006 and (3) stock options and stock-like claims subject to a minimum holding period.  
The following table displays the values of these components in percentage of the value of the overall 
compensation for UBS in 2006 and 2007 and for Deutsche Bank in 2007.                                                     
 
Firm  Base salary  Cash bonus  Stock and stock options 
UBS 2006  6%  47%  47% 
UBS 2007  22%  50%  28% 
Deutsche Bank 2007  13%  52%  35% 
 
Table 3: Compensation package of UBS and Deutsche Bank, 2006 and 2007, Source: Annual report 
While 2006 was a good year for UBS, this is not true of 2007 explaining the relative increase of the 
base salary. In all three cases, the base salary is rather small and the cash bonus is quite high.    23
Regarding conflicts between managers and stock owners, the third long-term component serves to 
align their interests.  More critical is the second component because it provides short-term 
incentives for managers which may be in conflict with shareholder value. Discussing incentive 
systems in the financial sector needs to take into consideration organizational aspects. The bank is 
managed by a team of managers so that one might want to look into team theories. We will not 
discuss the team aspect here, instead we assume a single bank manager.  
A simple numerical example 
Since we are looking into potential causes of the subprime crisis, we illustrate our arguments by 
using securitization as an example. Our example of the manager’s choice is a deliberately simple one 
and completely ignores moral hazard problems and reputation effects. We just look at the initial 
manager choice to pinpoint some important aspects to consider in setting up an incentive system. 
Like in securitizations the manager can choose between loan portfolios of different quality, all with a 
maturity of 7 years. The best portfolio has an AAA-rating, the worst one a B-rating. We are not 
concerned about tranching the portfolio into an equity piece and rated tranches but assume that the 
bank retains the default risk itself.  In the first scenario, the bank has a given amount of money to 
invest. In the second scenario, a leverage option is included. In this scenario, the manager cannot 
only invest the given amount of money, but can also borrow money elsewhere and invest this 
money in addition into an augmented loan portfolio. 
Scenario 1 
In the first scenario, the bank has given 100 loans, each with a par value of $1 million, the same 
initial rating and 7 years to maturity. The risk free rate is 3.25% p.a., the credit spreads for the loans 
are given in Table 4 together with the cumulative default probabilities over 7 years. These 
probabilities are taken from S&P. In case of default, the loss given default is assumed to be 60%. 
The credit spreads are chosen such that the annual net risk premium divided by the annualized 
expected default loss is about 9.25 for AAA-loans and declines to about 1.5 for B-loans. The annual 
net risk premium is defined as the credit spread minus (annual transaction costs of 50 bp plus the 
annualized expected default loss). 
 
Rating  Default probability  Credit spread  Annual net risk premium 
AAA  0,285 %  0,75 %  0,226 % 
AA  0,701 %  0,85 %  0,290 % 
A  1,368 %  0,95 %   0,333 % 
BBB  4,443 %  1,45 %  0,569 % 
BB  15,110 %  3,45 %  1,655 % 
B  32,903 %  7,70 %  4,380 %   24
 
Table 4: Default probabilities, credit spreads and net annual risk premiums for loans of different ratings 
A loan defaults in year t if its rating changes to D. Rating transitions are simulated using the S&P 
transition matrix year by year. The 100 loans belong to 10 different industries. The rating transitions 
of loans belonging to the same industry are correlated with 20%, those of loans belonging to 
different industries are correlated with 5%.    
In the first scenario, the manager only chooses the initial rating of the loans. Every year she receives 
a base salary and a bonus which cannot be negative. The bonus equals the bonus-profit of the year, 
multiplied by the participation rate. The bonus-profit is the internal profit on which the bonus 
depends. The bonus-profit in year t equals the credit spread earned on the loans which have not 
defaulted until the beginning of the year minus the loss given default (60%) on the loans which 
default in this year. Thus, the annual transaction cost of 50 bp is excluded in the bonus-profit
13. In 
each year the certainty equivalent of the manager’s compensation is derived using a power utility 
function with relative risk aversion λ. Then the total income of the manager is derived as the date 0-
present value of the certainty equivalents in years 1 to 7, using the risk-free rate as the discount rate. 
In this simple setup, the manager does not bear any outside risks and she cannot hedge any income 
risks. It is well known that in a complete market the manager can hedge every risk so that incentives 
of performance related compensation packages disappear. 
The shareholders of the bank invest $100 million initially and receive the terminal portfolio value 
after 7 years. This value equals the principal plus interest income (= risk-free rate plus credit spread) 
on all non-defaulted loans, compounded at the risk-free rate to the terminal date, plus the 
compounded recovery values of all defaulted loans, minus the compounded payments to the 
manager. For the shareholders the terminal portfolio value is also converted into a certainty 
equivalent using a slightly modified power function with given relative risk aversion. The 
modification is that the shareholders´ terminal wealth is composed of the terminal portfolio value 
plus some given exogenous wealth, for example $50 million. Therefore the risk premium implied by 
the certainty equivalent is rather small. Finally the certainty equivalent is discounted at the risk-free 
rate to date 0 to yield the shareholder value of the portfolio
14.  
Table 5 displays the results. The left panel shows the total income of the manager for different loan 
qualities, assuming a constant relative risk aversion coefficient, λ = 2.5. The right panel shows the 
                                                 
13 The transaction cost could be included, but this would not change the results in any significant way, because the 
manager will be compensated by an increase in her base salary.  
14 Alternatively, one could use an exogenously given pricing kernel to derive the market value of the portfolio. The 
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shareholder values, assuming an identical λ = 2.5 for the shareholders. They, however, have 
additional terminal wealth of $50 million,  making them less risk averse. In order to see the impact 
of the profit participation rate, we consider four different participation rates of 1%, 8%, 10% and 
20%. The base salary will be adjusted to the participation rate such that the total income the 
manager will earn is roughly the same.  
Total Income of Manager (in 1000 $)  Shareholder Value (in million $) 
Base salary  125  40 35 20  125 40 35 20 
Participation  1 %  8 %  10 %  20%  1 %  8 %  10 %  20 % 
Rating            
AAA  817.1 605.4 661.3 986.4  103.7 103.9  103.8 103.5 
AA 821.7  631.7  690.6  1,007.6  104.0 104.1  104.2 103.7 
A  825.6 648.0 705.3 964.2  104.1 104.2  103.9  103.3 
BBB  804.8 682.7 722.4 799.0 104.0  104.0  103.9  103.3 
BB  892.7 794.1 796.6 636.5  103.3 102.9  102.7 101.6 
B  979.9 994.4 977.0 719.0 102.3  101.3  100.9  98.9 
Table 5: The table displays manager total income and the shareholder value for different combinations of base salary 
and profit participation rate. The first column shows the rating of the underlying portfolio. Bold figures show the 
highest total income resp. shareholder value, given the compensation package.                                    
Given a participation rate of 1% and a base salary of $125,000, the manager clearly chooses the poor 
loan quality B, earning a total income of about $980,000. This is due to the high annual profit 
generated with B-loans. The manager benefits strongly from this profit because she earns 1% of it 
when defaults are rare and in case of many defaults she does not suffer through a negative bonus. 
Moreover, a 1% bonus also imposes little risk on the manager so that she does not suffer from a 
substantial risk premium. The situation is different for the shareholders. Shareholder value is roughly 
the same for all loan qualities. This appears reasonable since credit spreads are market rates. Given 
the high B-risk, shareholder value is slightly lower due to imperfect diversification. Shareholder value 
is highest for the A-portfolio.   
With a participation rate of 8 or 10%, the manager still prefers the B-quality. For substantially higher 
participation rates, she prefers loans of better ratings. A high participation rate imposes a high risk 
on the manager which reduces her certainty equivalent substantially for low quality loans.
15 
Therefore the certainty equivalent of the bonus first increases and then declines with a higher 
participation rate, given the loan quality.  
                                                 
15 Disentangling the effects of the participation rate, first, consider the call option feature of the bonus. Since the bonus 
is nonnegative, the bonus is a call option on the portfolio payoffs. A call option is more valuable if the underlying risk, 
represented by Vega in most option pricing models is higher. This effect is also present here. But in contrast to option 
pricing models, in which the pricing kernel is exogenously given, the manager evaluates the risk individually, given her 
utility function. This means that doubling her income in a given state of nature does not double her utility in that state, 
because the utility function is strictly concave. In other words, the endogenous risk premium of the bonus is rather high 
if the participation rate and the underlying risk are high.   26
The important implication is the relation between the participation rate and the loan quality chosen. 
A high participation rate lowers the shareholders’ risk through better loan quality, it also lowers the 
bankruptcy probability of the bank. If shareholders prefer better loan quality, then they should not 
choose a low participation rate. If they prefer very good quality, then a rather high participation rate 
is needed.  
This finding does not change substantially if shareholders combine a bonus with a small share in the 
terminal value of the portfolio (TV share), equivalent to the extreme form of bonus deferral and 
similar to stock-based compensation with a long holding period. The reason why the findings are 
similar is that with no leverage, the probability of bank losses is rather small so that the option 
feature of the bonus does not really matter. Hence a low (high) participation rate and a small (large) 
terminal value share have similar effects and induce the manager to choose B-loans (AAA-loans). 
The higher the participation rate and the terminal value share, the better is the portfolio quality 
chosen by the manager.  
Scenario 2 
The story changes fundamentally in the second scenario in which the manager can also choose the 
bank’s leverage. So far the portfolio had a par value of $100 million, fully financed by equity capital. 
Now the manager can borrow $100x million from outside and invest in the portfolio $100 (1+x) 
million. Hence (1+x) can be interpreted as the volume of the bank’s portfolio in units of $100 
million, while x is the leverage of the bank, i.e. its debt/equity ratio. With leverage, each loan volume 
is inflated by the factor (1+x), holding the credit spread constant as is typical in buying securitization 
tranches. For simplicity, the manager gets a base salary plus a bonus, but no terminal value share.  
 
First assume that the interest expense on bank borrowing charged to the bonus-profit increases 
linearly with the borrowed amount, i.e. the charged interest rate is independent of the leverage. 
Then, given the quality of the portfolio and the base salary, the manager maximizes the leverage. 
The reason is obvious. Leverage implies that the bonus-profit increases linearly with leverage. Since 
the bonus can never be negative, the bonus will be multiplied by the factor (1+x) through leverage. 
This represents a first order stochastic dominance improvement of the bonus. Hence, given loan 
quality, the total income of the manager increases monotonically with leverage. Since the risk 
premium of the bonus increases disproportionally with leverage
16 and the base salary stays constant, 
                                                 
16 Given a positive base salary, the manager displays increasing relative risk aversion with respect to the bonus. Her 
relative risk aversion approaches λ so that for high leverage levels her total income increases almost proportionally to 
leverage.   27
the total income increases with leverage at a declining rate. This is visible, in particular, for bad loan 
qualities. 
 
The incentive to maximize leverage would be even stronger if leverage would not multiply the par 
value of each of the 100 loans, but multiply the number of loans to different obligors in each of the 
given industries so that the diversification of the loan portfolio improves. This would imply an 
additional second order stochastic dominance improvement which benefits both, the manager and 
the shareholders. Table 6 illustrates these results. The base salary is always $40,000 and the 
participation rate is 8%. The computations are based on a loan portfolio in which the par value of 
each loan is multiplied by (1+x).     
            
                          
Total Income of Manager (in 1000 $)  Shareholder Value (in million $) 
Base salary 40        
Participation Rate 8  %         
Volume  1  2 25  35  1  2 25  35 
Borrowing Rate  3.25 %  3.25 %  3.25 %  3.25 %  3.25 %  3.25 %  3.25 %  3.25 % 
Rating            
AAA 605.4  954.3  8,345.8 11,306.1 103.9 108.0  202.7 243.8 
AA 631.7  994.8  7,097,7  8,886.4 104.1 108.6  209.0  252.1 
A 648.0  1,007.7  5,237.6 6,159.1  104.2 108.8  209.8  252.1 
BBB 682.7  992.2  2,604.5  2,708.3 104.0 108.6  183.8  202.6 
BB  794.1  1,020.4 1,470.6 1,485.7 102.9 107.2  104.7  100.2 
B  994.4 1,223.1  1,579.7 1,579.7  101.3 104.7 69.7  66.5 
 
Table 6: The table displays manager total income and the shareholder value for different portfolio volumes due to 
leverage. The manager earns a base salary of $40,000; her profit participation rate is 8%. The first column shows the 
rating of the underlying portfolio. The bank always pays 3.25% on its debt. Bold figures show the highest total income 
resp. shareholder value, given volume.           
 
Given a low portfolio volume, the manager chooses the B-quality. High volumes increase the bonus 
risk.  To mitigate this effect, she chooses a better loan quality. For a volume of x=25 and more, she 
prefers AAA-loans. More generally, the higher the volume or leverage, the better is the loan quality. 
This finding is consistent with highly leveraged vehicles like SIVs and ABCP-conduits which usually 
are highly levered and mostly hold AAA-assets.  
For the shareholders the effects of leverage are quite different. Shareholder value increases with 
leverage for a wide range, given high quality loans. The additional credit spreads outweigh the 
additional risk, since default risk is low. The situation is different for low quality loans. High default 
losses are fully borne by the shareholders until all equity capital is fully absorbed. These losses 
increase with leverage eating up more of the terminal value. This is evident in table 3, in particular, 
for B-loans. For a volume of 35, shareholder value drops to $66.5 million. Since shareholders have   28
limited liability, the bank may go bankrupt. The bankruptcy probability strongly increases with 
leverage destabilizing financial stability, irrespective of loan quality.   
 
If the manager would participate in the terminal value like a shareholder, then this would have little 
effect on the manager’s choice. As Table 6 shows, the shareholders also benefit from a very high 
leverage, given very good portfolio quality. Therefore, terminal value participation does not 
discourage the manager to choose a very high leverage. 
 
What do we learn from this simple model? The good news is that although the manager generally 
prefers high to low leverage, this preference is strongest for good portfolio quality. Shareholders are 
also happy with this policy. This simple model appears to portray quite well what happened in 
several banks before the subprime crisis. They bought high quality tranches of RMBS-transactions 
using high leverage. The bad news is twofold. First, the model results depend heavily on the 
parameters underlying the simulation. Once these parameters are questioned, the implications of 
high leverage can be highly significant for the bank’s default probability
17. Given some recent years 
with small default losses, the temptation is to be careless, adjusting parameters to this favorable 
development ignoring the usual long term swings. This would yield misleading model results and 
render risk controlling ineffective.  
 
The usual argument that risk controlling driven by the shareholders’ interest, assures strict limits of 
risk taking does not appear to be credible once the parameters used for risk controlling are 
questioned
18. This doubt is reinforced by the possibility that also the shareholders might believe to 
benefit from a higher leverage and, therefore, are not interested in strict risk control. This benefit 
would be even stronger if some risks of high leverage are not borne by the shareholders themselves, 
but by third parties.    
Second, given a bonus which increases with leverage by first and/or second order stochastic 
dominance, the manager’s interest in high leverage is quite strong. This endangers not only the 
bank’s solvency, but also financial stability.  
 
Therefore, we believe that the current crisis is partly triggered by the strong interest of some 
managers in high leverage. This may explain why the Swiss Federal Banking Commission proposes 
stricter limits on banks’ leverage as a simple cure. However, we believe that a far more promising 
                                                 
17 Particularly dangerous is a short term funding policy of banks because bank creditors may feel strongly exposed to the 
default risk and refuse further lending.  
18 The manager may spend much energy in reengineering model parameters so as to make her high leverage policy 
appear less risky.   29
route for controlling risk taking is to change the reward system for managers. The bonus component 
should be supplemented by a malus component so that the manager’s interest in taking high risk is 
clearly mitigated. There are several possibilities of doing that.  
One possibility is to fire the manager when default losses exceed a certain trigger. This policy can be 
made credible by an employment contract which defines these triggers. What are the implications?  
If fired, the manager’s income is unlikely to be zero. First, she may get some unemployment 
compensation, and second, it may take only a limited time to get a new job. Since the bank is not 
allowed to communicate the bad performance of the manager, reputation damages may be small 
enabling her to find a job again. In addition, the manager might expect to be fired in case of 
substantial losses even if her employment contract does not state that. Therefore, we are sceptical 
about the effectiveness of a contractual firing trigger. Yet, as shown in the appendix, a firing trigger 
would constrain the manager’s preferred leverage. 
Another more effective malus component is to adjust the bonus-profit for leverage. Instead of  
using a firing trigger, we assume that the bonus-profit is derived using an interest rate for bank 
borrowing which increases with leverage, but is otherwise independent of the bank’s policy. This 
may appear to be in conflict with rational expectations of creditors, but it illustrates a typical 
phenomenon of liquid asset markets, that is the managerial option to change bank risk very fast 
through trading liquid financial assets without informing creditors. Therefore, we assume that the 
borrowing rate charged to the bonus-profit, only depends on leverage. Since credit spreads paid by 
banks are clearly lower than credit spreads paid on securitization tranches, we choose a rather 
modest increase of the borrowing rate with the leverage. Table 7 illustrates the results.  
 
Total Income of Manager (in 1000 $)  Shareholder Value (in million $) 
Base salary  40          
Participation Rate 8  %            
Volume  1  2  10 15 20 25  1  2 10 15 20 25 
Borrowing Rate 3.25%  3.3%  3.36%  3.44% 3.55% 3.75% 3.25% 3.3% 3.38% 3.48% 3.6% 3.75%
Rating               
AAA 605.4  891.2  2,913  2,925 3,065 2,527 103.9 107.4 135.6 146.9 150.4 135.2
AA 631.7  931.6  3,008 3,284 1,919 1,813 104.1 108.0 138.3 150.9 155.5 141.0
A 648.0  951.1  2,784  3,239 2,834 1,319 104.2 108.2 139.2 151.8 156.3 140.3
BBB 682.7  936.1  1,875  1,661 1,155 1,149 104.0 108.0 136.0 143.1 138.2 113.1
BB 794.1  990.7  1,310  1,280 1,194 1,132 102.9 106.7 112.1 101.0 87.7  70.4 
B  994.4 1,203 1,482 1,482 1,411 1,344 101.3 104.4 82.2 71.9 64.6 56.5 
 
Table 7: The table displays manager total income and the shareholder value for different portfolio volumes due to 
leverage. The manager earns a base salary of $40,000; her profit participation rate is 8%. There is no firing of the 
manager. The interest rate paid by the bank increases with volume as shown in line five. The first column shows the 
rating of the underlying portfolio. Bold figures show the highest total income resp. shareholder value, given volume.                            
                                                 
Given the volume restrictions in table 7, the manager maximizes her total income choosing AA-
loans and a volume of 15, i.e. a leverage of 14. In this example, the malus imposed on the manager   30
by increasing funding costs is very effective. Hence, market discipline imposed by credit spreads can 
be an effective malus. Also shareholders are quite satisfied. The manager’s choice also protects 
creditors quite well since AA-loans have low default risk, so that financial stability is protected. The 
strength of these effects depends, of course, on the relationship between the imputed borrowing 
rate and the bank’s leverage.  
The manager’s choice would be similar if she also participates in the terminal value like a 
shareholder. In the example, shareholders would prefer A-loans with a volume of 20. 
The malus effects would not only be weakened by a smaller sensitivity of the borrowing rate to 
leverage, but also by the manager’s attempts to undercut the malus. Managers have more decision 
parameters than just loan quality and leverage. They can effectively design loans to shift hazard rates 
from the early to the late years so as to mitigate the adverse effects of loan defaults. One method is 
to extend loans in case of financial distress of the debtor so that the loan does not become 
delinquent or does not go into default. Alternatively, in the subprime crisis, many loans granted were 
sweetened with teaser rates. In the first one or two years, debtors are charged low interest rates and 
subsequently there is a strong step up in interest rates. The effect is not only to provide debtors 
some relief in the first periods, but also to shift the hazard rates of the loans from early to late years. 
This is illustrated in the appendix. 
Regarding the manager’s incentives, it is critical how the annual bonus-profit is determined. If, as in 
the teaser rate-example, profits are artificially shifted from the late to the early years, then this tends 
to shift the manager’s income-certainty equivalents to the early years, too. This might render her 
more aggressive. More importantly, the bonus-profits in the first years are misleading because they 
do not reflect the shift of default risks to the later years. A bonus-profit scheme should avoid these 
time distortions so as to provide undistorted long term incentives for the manager. More generally, 
the bonus-profit should be designed in a forward looking manner such that expected late period 
losses and risks are anticipated on an annualized basis. Otherwise the manager is riding on the 
distorted term structure of bonus-profits rendering malus components ineffective.      
The previous examples demonstrate the dangers inherent in various incentive systems. One might 
question several assumptions made in these examples. For instance, the manager might be less risk 
averse inducing her to take more risks. She might be able to hedge part of the bonus risk which also 
might induce her to take more risk. But the qualitative conclusions from these examples are similar 
even if we change the parameters. Therefore the qualitative conclusions appear to be robust so that 
we do not present more simulation results. 
 
Lessons learned from scenarios 1 and 2   31
What are the lessons to be learned? First, a bonus system with a low (high) participation rate is likely 
to motivate the manager to acquire low (high) quality financial assets given low leverage. Hence 
shareholders can influence the quality of financial assets through the participation rate.  
Second, nonnegative bonus payments induce the manager to choose high leverage. Even though 
high leverage usually goes together with good quality of financial assets, high leverage may put a high 
loss risk on shareholders and endanger financial stability through a substantial default probability of 
the bank. Therefore a bonus/malus system is required which clearly puts a threat on the manager for 
high leverage. The bonus/malus system should induce long term manager orientation. Accounting 
of bonus-profits needs to be forward looking in the sense that losses and risks which materialize in 
future periods need to be incorporated already today. 
 
The effects of an incentive system depend on the manager’s risk attitudes and on the investment and 
financing policies available to her. Moreover, they depend on the bank’s internal control system. 
Therefore the effects are difficult to predict for outsiders. This leads to an important conclusion, 
namely that any outside regulation of a bank’s incentive system seems to be inappropriate. It might 
be useful, however, for other market participants interacting with the bank to have information on 
the bank’s incentive system. This information might improve their understanding of bank risks.  
 
We add a more speculative remark on performance based compensation regarding the balance of 
managerial concern between her income and financial stability. We suspect that a manager with a 
strong short term performance-based compensation worries little about the impact of her policy on 
financial stability. In contrast, a manager with a significant long term performance-based 
compensation is more concerned about financial stability because she has to lose relatively more in a 
financial turmoil. This effect is likely to be even stronger for a manager with a high base salary and 
low performance based compensation. In other words, we suspect that performance based 
compensation reinforces a manager’s concern about her income at the expense of public welfare 
showing up in financial stability. Given that this view is correct, then compensation packages should 
have a low bonus component unless the bonus-profit can reliably be designed to be long term 
forward looking. But the current crisis proves how difficult it is to design such a bonus-profit 
scheme. Hence, it appears that in designing compensation packages not only interests between 
managers and shareholders should be aligned, but equally important, interests between managers 
and the public as reflected in financial stability should be aligned. 
A final remark on compensation and securitization relates to the observation that the huge supply of 
securitization tranches in previous years allowed the manager to acquire loans of any quality in 
almost unlimited amounts at constant credit spreads. A similar possibility does not exist in   32
traditional banking. A bank cannot substantially expand its loan business with its own clientele at 
constant credit spreads. It would have to lower credit spreads or acquire new customers which 
usually also requires lower credit spreads, holding default risk constant. This would limit bank 
expansion and, thus, on risk taking, in contrast to the securitization business.  
3.5 Effects of Risk transfer on Loan Quality and Bank Risk taking 
The previous discussion of various agency problems illustrated various perils of the financial system. 
Clearly, the multi-tier lending system with insufficient alignment of incentives along the value chain 
endangers lending standards, thereby negatively affecting the average quality of loans. This hazard 
will be reinforced if both, bank managers and shareholders benefit from this quality degradation. 
This is the case if loan volume can be expanded so as to earn higher profits from securitizing loans, 
without assuming the increased default risks.  
Thus, does the risk transfer in securitizations undermine the quality of bank lending? There is ample 
evidence that the lending standards in the US MBS market have been eroded over the past couple of 
years
19. It is well known that the share of subprime loans in overall US mortgage backed (MBS) 
lending increased in 2005 and 2006. It is also likely that the strong increase in US MBS lending 
would not have been possible without spreading the risks across various parts of the world through 
securitization. The reason is simply that otherwise the lending institutions would have run into 
serious problems with their regulatory capital requirements. Yet, the US MBS lending cannot simply 
be generalized to other segments of bank lending. First, in Continental Europe MBS lending has 
mostly been conservative over the last years. Also, credit standards for corporate and private 
borrowers in Europe have changed somewhat over time, but not strongly
20. Hence it will be difficult 
to argue that the strong increase in European securitization over the period from 2000 to 2006 
(according to HSBC (2007), the average annual growth rate was 40.2% with an issuance volume of 
about $80 billion in 2000 and about $725 billion in 2006) has loosened credit standards. Therefore 
we argue that the loosening of credit standards in the US MBS market was supported by 
securitization, but cannot be attributed solely to it. 
Purnanandam (2008) compares mortgage-related write-offs among banks that differ with respect to 
their involvement in true sale securitizations. The author finds charge-offs to be significantly higher 
for firms engaged in securitizations. He interprets this finding as evidence in favour of the loan 
quality deterioration hypothesis, a natural consequence of an aggressive mortgage lending.   
                                                 
19 See, for example, the article „Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread“, published in the New York Times, Dec.18, 
2007. This article gives account of many discussions in the Fed regarding mortgage related lending practices, starting in 
2000. 
20 The European Central Bank regularly publishes reports on credit standards in its monthly reports.   33
Data limitations have frustrated attempts to estimate the moral hazard effects of MBS-
securitizations. Keys/Mukherjee/Seru/Vig (2008) take an indirect approach in comparing default 
rates of loans that, according to the standardized FICO rating, are eligible for a securitization 
transaction with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
21. After controlling for other possible determining 
factors, the authors find above FICO-621 loans to have a default probability 20% higher (1% higher 
in absolute terms) than FICO-619 firms
22. The authors explain this difference by the higher 
likelihood of the FICO-621 loans to be securitized that motivated banks to reduce monitoring of 
these loans.  While the evidence is somewhat indirect, since they cannot show that lenders are 
lenient with those borrowers whose loans are securitized – their result is the first widely cited 
evidence of material incentive problems in securitizations.  
Regarding financial stability, not only the impact of securitization on loan quality matters, but also 
the question whether securitization makes banks more vulnerable through higher risk taking. Does 
the risk transfer in securitizations reduce or increase the overall risks taken by securitizing banks?  
So far, the existing empirical evidence is not very strong, due to a lack of appropriate studies. The 
enormous growth in securitizations over the last couple of years is one indicator of a rise in overall 
risk, since not all the risks have been transferred to outside investors. Worldwide growth rates in 
securitization often exceeded 25% over the last years. Some of this growth is also due to arbitrage 
transactions and, therefore, does not reflect increased lending. But these numbers do not clearly 
indicate whether originating banks expand their lending activities because of securitization. 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) do not find a clear relation between a bank’s risk and its 
securitization activities. A study by Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2005) looks at balance sheet data 
of banks and finds that securitizing banks tend to buy more protection in the credit derivatives 
market and also tend to have low capital ratios. The latter finding is consistent with more risk taking. 
Franke and Krahnen (2005) analyse the stock market betas of securitizing banks and finds that they 
increase with securitization transactions, in particular, with repeated transactions. This finding is 
consistent with the interpretation that securitizing banks expand their loan portfolios so that the 
systematic risk of these portfolios increases. Based on credit risk-models like the KMV-model, the 
credit risk of a bank should be correlated with stock price movements of borrowers. Hence the 
market value of a more granular credit portfolio which also drives bank market value, should be 
correlated more with the stock market index, leading to higher betas of bank stocks. Therefore this 
finding supports the view that securitizing banks tend to take more credit risk. A related finding is 
reported in Haensel/Krahnen (2007).  
                                                 
21 The critical rating below which transfer to FM and FM is rules out is 620. Thus the study compares loans with Fico 
score 621 to a comparison group with a score of 619.  
22 The authors argue that the qualities of firms with FICO scores of 619 and 621 are basically indistinguishable.    34
To summarize, the process of securitization has led to a decomposition of the once-integrated value 
chain into a chain of isolated activities. Of course, these activities need to be coordinated, in order to 
avoid moral hazard over the life of the underlying contractual relationship, and adverse selection at 
origination
23. Effective coordination along the value chain appears hard to implement. The available 
evidence is still weak, but it shows clearly in the direction of quality deteriorations of US MBS loans 
triggered by securitization. Similarly, the evidence about securitization on bank risk taking also 
indicates a positive impact, but of course more robust tests are needed to establish the relevance of 
incentive alignment for the rise in credit risk in securitization markets. 
 
3.6 The Transparency Failure  
3.6.1 Transparency about asset quality  
Intransparency is often quoted as one of the main drivers of the asset market and the interbank 
market illiquidity. Transparency has different layers, one being transparency about the quality of 
financial assets, the other one being transparency of counterparty risks in the interbank market. We 
start with the transparency of asset quality. 
For remote investors, the quality of structured financial assets is hard to evaluate. When banks are 
interested to buy protection from others, they are interested to play down the risks to be insured. 
Hence their quality statements are not entirely credible. In contrast, the quality statements of the big 
rating agencies have been regarded with some trust by market participants. The value of rating 
information for market participants depends on the stationarity of the rating-default mapping. 
Concerning stability of the rating process, Blume/Lim/McKinlay (1998) largely confirm stability of 
the rating process; they cannot identify any loosening of rating standards over time, they rather find 
a slight hardening of these standards. Their findings are consistent with the theoretical models of the 
rating industry, which emphasize credibility and reputation with respect to information collection 
and firm monitoring for understanding the business model of agencies, see for instance 
Millon/Thakor (1985).  
More recent papers stress the two-way interaction between rating agencies and firms concerning, 
e.g., capital structure or investment decisions. For example, Kisgen (2006)
24 shows that firms 
                                                 
23 Note that value chain optimization has been a popular project area for bank consultancies, like Accenture, Mercer 
Oliver Wyman among many others. Given the IT-driven agenda of these exercises in business process re-engineering, it 
is a t least imaginable that the issue of incentive alignment was largely neglected, leading to the above results.  
24 Drawing on the theoretical work by Boot/Milbourn/Schmeits (2006).   35
endangered to loose a particular rating notch, try to ‘improve’ their capital structure, i.e. to issue less 
debt relative to equity than otherwise. The author concludes that firms want to meet standards set 
by agencies, thereby showing that rating downgrades are in fact costly for firms.  
Investment grade (BBB+-rated and above) has become a well-known quality label, even in colloquial 
language, classifying financial instruments as of low default risk. This is even more relevant for the 
top rating notch, AAA. Financial instruments with a top notch rating from one of the big agencies 
are expected to have a very low ex-ante default probability. For example, averaged over the past 20 
years, an AAA classified bond has experienced a one-year default incidence of less than 0.1 
percent
25. For this reason, obtaining a large-as-possible AAA tranche was a key objective in 
transaction design. AAA fixed income investment products were widely seen as an asset class of 
minimal risk, thus well suited for investors with little expertise in risk assessment. AAA rated assets 
are therefore deemed to be particularly attractive to remote investors, that is investors with little or 
no ability to monitor the intermediary, let alone the ultimate borrower. The flourishing market for 
AAA rated securities and tranches is (or was) relying on the credibility of an independent and 
reliable rating process. The risk assessment of structured finance products was believed to be 
transparent, despite the complex design of some of these instruments. Of course, transparency is 
only a borrowed transparency, borrowed from the rating agencies as delegated monitors. 
As pointed out in the introduction, asset securitization evolved over the nineties, following the 
typical dynamics of (financial) innovations, see Ross (1989)
26. Rating agencies played an important 
role in this process. Riddiough/Chiang (2003) concludes that rating agencies, through the process of 
standardization, have played “a unique role” in developing and popularizing the market for 
securitization transactions among investors.  
 As independent experts, agencies evaluated the asset portfolios and assigned subordination levels to 
the tranches with given ratings. Investors were apparently trusting delegated monitoring, and were 
acting as if the risk characteristics of securitization tranches were transparent to them. The expertise 
of major rating agencies, and their ability to separate safe, investment grade assets from risky, non-
investment grade assets, allowed complex financial instruments, like CDO tranches or CDO squared 
notes to be marketed worldwide. According to BIS (2008), the downgrading avalanche experienced 
                                                 
25 These probabilities are taken from a rating table, which draws on the time series of thousands of bond issues over the 
past decades. 
26 As shown by Riddiough/Chiang (2003), in their clinical study on the emergence of the Structured Finance industry, 
two companies were formative for market development at about the same time, the early 1990ies, namely Nomura 
Securities and Lehman Brothers. The securitization model used by Nomura emphasized a “straightforward” waterfall 
structure. Due to its simplicity, Nomura became the standard setter for the industry. Lehman, in contrast, was said to 
focus on complex structured finance products, using lower quality asset pools. Ironically, at the time of writing, it was 
apparently Lehman Brother’s own book of structured products, involving protection sold, that eventually brought the 
firm down.   36
in October and November 2007 was unheard of among corporate bonds
27. For these bonds, rating 
migration has followed a fairly stable distribution.  
The massive wave of downgrades for basically all structured finance asset classes in the year 2008 
has raised the question whether the methodologies used by the agencies were appropriate for such 
structures. We suspect that this is not the case. It is well known, that the tranching is very 
susceptible to the distributional assumptions describing the underlying pool of claims, in particular, 
asset correlations and the moments of the portfolio loss rate distribution
28.  
Krahnen/Wilde (2008), in a numerical analysis, point out that AAA tranches and corporate bonds of 
the same rating quality possess very different sensitivities to a macro risk factor. Given the same 
default probability for tranches and bonds, e.g. 1 percent for a maturity of 10 years, their macro 
factor sensitivity differs considerably. It is much stronger for the tranche than for the bond. This is 
due to the strong diversification in AAA tranches making them much more sensitive to the macro-
factor. This explains why tranche ratings are more sensitive to macro factor deteriorations than 
bonds. It is also well known among experts that an increase in correlation among underlying assets 
shifts potential default losses from the FLP to the AAA tranche. In contrast, a first order stochastic 
dominance deterioration of the loss rate distribution raises potential default losses of the FLP and 
the AAA-tranche.  
Such differences in sensitivities between tranches and bonds were not widely known, and they were 
certainly not reported to the outside investor
29. Even experts in the industry hardly saw any need to 
qualify the use of well-known bond ratings for assessing default risk of tranches from a 
securitization transaction, or to add caveats to their use as risk.  
The strong impact of a first order stochastic dominance deterioration of the loss rate distribution on 
the default risk of an AAA-tranche is relevant for our analysis. This is because another, typically 
non-reported piece of information may have a strong impact on the portfolio loss rate expected by 
the market. This critical piece of information is the originator’s recourse, or his retention of the FLP, 
because of its effect on incentives.
30 In this context it deserves mention that to date, despite all 
efforts by analysts and researchers, there exists no overview of equity piece allocation, perhaps 
                                                 
27 Of the 198 AAA-rated tranches downgraded in this period, the median downgrade is reported to be 7 notches, while 
30 tranches were downgraded by more than 10 notches. Looking at downgrade statistics from 1970 to today, AAA 
bonds wee never downgraded by more than 6 notches – and even these cases are extremely rare (p. 22).  
28 Krahnen/Wilde (2008), Franke/Hein (2008). 
29 Gibson (2004) presents a detailed description of the pooling and tranching methodology used by the major agencies. 
30 A more complete presentation of this argument will have to lay out the value enhancing effect of long-term 
relationships, accompanied by risk underwriting and, therefore, long-term incentive alignment concerning initial 
screening, intensive monitoring, and proper bail-out incentives (see Brunner/Krahnen 2008).   37
because financial institutions did not recognize yet the signalling potential a revelation of equity 
retention could have on the market
31.  
Thus the retention decision is a necessary piece of information if one wishes to estimate the default 
risk of an asset portfolio and of securitization tranches.  Rating agencies may have some knowledge 
about the whereabout of equity pieces, but they apparently have not made use of this information 
publicly.  
Furthermore, it appears that the retention question was typically not discussed among model 
builders, as they probably felt it to be irrelevant for their estimations
32. Since these models rely on 
historical loan portfolio data in validating ratings, and since on-balance sheet transactions were the 
norm before the advent of securitization, the models used by the agencies may fail to recognize the 
importance of first loss piece retention.   
The issue of opaqueness of effective risk allocation has been addressed by several authors, e.g. 
Gorton (2008), and Brunnermeier (2008). These authors point at the complexity of the pooling and 
tranching methodology, and the difficulty to see through the many layers of CDOs, conduits and 
other financial institutions. However, they do not address the retention decision which we believe to 
be at the core of the problem. Note that opaqueness relating to the location of senior tranches, as 
mentioned by Gorton (2008), will have little, if anything, repercussion on the underlying asset value. 
Hence senior tranche opaqueness will have less dramatic consequences than opaqueness relating to 
junior tranches. Interestingly, it is apparently easier to obtain information on the allocation of senior 
tranches
33. 
To summarize, we find transparency about financial assets, in particular, securitization tranches, to 
be quite limited, as investors typically relied on rating agencies when assessing the risk of individual 
instruments. Whether that it leads to a systematic underestimation of default risk, awaits empirical 
research. The issue of opacity was seriously discussed only after mid 2007, perhaps because at that 
                                                 
31 On an ECB conference on statistics in 2006, the need of detailed information on equity piece allocation was discussed, 
and proposals for implementation were discussed as a novel idea, see Haensel/Krahnen/Wilde (2006). 
32 Despite many attempts by both authors to address this topic in workshops with practitioners, mostly financial 
engineers, and on industry gatherings since 2004, the question was never given a serious response, or debate. Another 
sign of complete negligence vis-à-vis the incentive issue relates to the technical manuals published by the rating agencies, 
explaining their modelling technique. While these manuals do not specify the exact details of the procedure, presumably 
to avoid exact replication by rivals and customers, we could not find any hint to the sort of retention-related agency 
problems we are addressing. See also Gorton (2008).  
33 See the table “Estimated holdings of AAA CDO tranches”, p. 43 in Gorton (2008), which shows a breakdown of 
holdings by type of buyer. Similar tables for junior tranches do not exist.   38
point it became clear to many investors that the incentives in the underlying business were 
misaligned
34.  
 
3.6.2 Transparency about counterparty risks  
In 2008, several investment banks collapsed even though their tier 1 and tier 2 capital ratios were 
clearly above the levels required by Basel  II. Speculative attacks by investor’s short-selling stocks of 
these banks proved very profitable. Therefore in many countries short-selling was restricted. This 
raises the question why these banks apparently could not survive. Our explanation assumes a serious 
failure of transparency about counterparty risks. Even though banks publish quarterly reports, these 
reports do not present a clear picture of the overall risk position of these banks. Even fellow banks 
will find it hard to evaluate the risk position of their peers.  
As an example, consider the value at risk-figures published by banks before the onset of the crisis. 
Typically, these numbers were quite small, relative to the write-downs required thereafter. A second 
indication is that the models used for the write-downs are not explained clearly. The series of 
additional write-downs shown by many financial institutions over the past 15 months may be caused 
by a fall of secondary market prices, but they may also be due to bank reporting policy, independent 
of market price movements. Third, banks are eager not to disclose their risk taking policy. This is 
probably motivated by the negative impact disclosure can have on the profitability of a particular 
trading strategy. Disclosure may furthermore increase the bank’s vulnerability with respect to 
strategic attacks by investors. Fourth, banks can alter their risk position very quickly, using financial 
assets, in particular, financial derivatives. Since derivatives can be traded with little impact on 
liquidity, such transactions are particularly easy to carry out.   
These arguments explain why bank risks may be difficult to evaluate from the outside. They also 
explain why risk reporting of banks is an important topic on the current policy agenda. The 
immediate implication of these problems is that it is very difficult to evaluate the counterparty risk 
implied by doing business with such banks. Another implication is that a bank cannot credibly 
invalidate adverse rumors about its solvency making it vulnerable to speculative attacks. 
Here we see another private good, public bad problem. Bank managers consider information about 
bank risk as valuable private information and, therefore, are reluctant to disclose it to the public. At 
the same time, financial markets cannot work properly without sufficient information on bank risks. 
Hence this information has a public good character. By not disclosing this information, managers try 
to free ride on financial stability, i.e. they hope that they can extract all the benefits from trading in 
                                                 
34 Ben Bernanke in a speech on the subprime lending market held on May 17, 2007, concluded: “In sum, some 
misalignment of incentives, together with a highly competitive lending environment and, perhaps, the fact that industry 
experience with subprime mortgage lending is relatively short, likely compromised the quality of underwriting.”   39
financial markets without contributing the necessary ingredients to the functioning of financial 
markets. 
 
3.7. Liquidity  
The final arguments of the previous subsection are closely related to the loss in market liquidity 
which has been documented widely
35. This liquidity loss is observed in financial asset markets as well 
in the interbank market. Looking at financial asset markets first, market micro-structure research has 
emphasized the importance of information on trading and pricing of financial assets. 
Glosten/Milgrom (1985), among others, has argued that transaction costs on asset markets, i.e. their 
degree of liquidity, is determined by the presence of informed traders. Their presence will force 
market makers to adjust the bid-ask spread upwards. Thus, the higher the likelihood to trade with an 
informed rather than with an uninformed trader, the higher must be the required spread in order for 
the market maker to break even. By setting a wide spread, the market maker effectively insures 
himself against a bad trade with an informed party.  
By a similar argument, the bid price for an asset will be inversely related to the degree of asset 
opacity. The term opacity describes the extent to which a bidder, using available information, is able 
to asses the “true” cash flow expectation and the riskiness of an asset. Thus, the liquidity (or rather: 
illiquidity) of an asset can be related to its informational regime. As we have argued in the previous 
subsections, transparency about securitization tranches is impaired by a lack of information on the 
agency problems in the value chain, on the retention of the FLP, and on the quality and stability of 
ratings as the main providers of transparency. Apparently, before the onset of the crisis, this lack of 
information was not felt to be critical by investors. Suddenly, investors became aware of this 
problem leading to a collapse of asset market liquidity. Not surprisingly, the opacity in asset 
valuation translates into opacity of financial intermediaries trading asset risks (see also Adrian and 
Shin (2008)). Given this and the refusal of managers to provide reliable risk reporting, the interbank 
market was doomed to collapse as well. 
We therefore believe that the liquidity loss in secondary markets for notes, bonds and commercial 
papers, as well as the shutdown of the interbank market is not a natural disaster, caused by a sudden 
decline of house prices in the US, nor is it the consequence of euphoria and fear in asset markets. 
Rather it is, at least in part, an implication of externalities imposed on financial market stability by 
those financial intermediaries that used securitization technology without regard to the stability of 
underlying asset quality. 
                                                 
35 See Allen/Carletti (2008) and Brunnermeier (2008) on the enormous loss in liquidity, emanating from the CDO 
market and then spreading to neighbouring markets with similar opacity characteristics.    40
4. The future of securitization 
4.1 Introduction 
Taking a helicopter view of today’s financial market turmoil, one is inevitably reminded of an old 
economic tale, the tragedy of the commons.  Originally coined by Gerrit Hardin in his seminal paper 
in Science in 1968, the author recounts the age-old story of the demise of community graze land, 
open to all dwellers belonging to a township. The upshot is, of course, that individuals pursuing 
their self-interest may exert external effects in the form of overgrazing, ultimately destroying the 
common resource.  
The crisis we now witness has some similar characteristics. Financial stability is a commons that is 
being undermined by overleveraging standard banking activities, by erosion of real estate loan 
quality, and by designing complex financial instruments, like CDOs, that eventually lost investor 
confidence. Market liquidity eroded to the point of complete market disruption, and prices fell to 
levels unimaginable at the time of issue.  
Still, eyed from the helicopter, we now realize that misaligned incentives on the micro level, i.e. the 
pursuit of individual happiness on the firm level, can lead to complete opacity on the macro level, 
eliminating vital market functionalities, namely pricing efficiency, market depth and liquidity.  
As usual, deficiencies on the micro-level are not universal. A large number of financial intermediaries 
retained a prudent policy over the last years. But others, including some large players, did not. This 
set off the infection which first hit these players, but then undermined the confidence in the 
financial system on a large scale with far-reaching contagion effects.  
As we tried to show in the earlier sections of this paper, this crisis is a “rational crisis”, it is not the 
result of irrational exuberance of any sort, nor is it the consequence of euphoria and fear, as some 
observers have argued (see Greenspan, FT 2008). We have identified weaknesses and violations of 
rules of prudent financial engineering that may be called the root cause of the immense degradation 
of asset value over the past 18 months. These violations have also contributed to the strong drying-
up of market liquidity in several of the most popular financial instruments of the last decade, like 
CDOs, CPs, and ABS in general.  
We have thus delivered a structural explanation of why the crisis was predictable, given the 
incentives of market participants, and given a set of inadequate “rules of the game” currently in 
place.    41
These constructional faults mainly refer to the design of securitization transactions, which in turn 
determine the subsequent decision making of banks, firms and households. Consider incentive 
compatible engineering. The tranching of asset portfolios, which is the key construction element of 
these transactions, did not (or not sufficiently) take into consideration the externality that a loan sale 
exerts on loan quality, both ex-ante and ex-post. Since incentive alignment can minimize this 
externality, one would have expected investors to ask for ample information describing incentive 
arrangements in these issues. But nothing of this sort happened; neither did the issuers inform the 
market, nor did the rating agencies address incentive compatibility publicly.  
As a result, the market was flooded with financial instruments whose underlying quality was doomed 
to deteriorate over time. The degradation of asset quality came as a surprise to individual and 
institutional investors, whose trust in agency ratings was badly disappointed. Investors responded 
rationally by shutting down the market.  
However, the question remains: why did financial engineers and managers pursue a strategy creating 
externalities in the first place? We have offered a view on this issue in the third chapter, but we 
acknowledge the existence of other explanations that produce similar predictions. Research may 
eventually tell the full story. One plausible explanation starts from an individual manager using 
securitization to maximize his wealth. The ensuing transfer of long-term assets from the balance 
sheet to investors in the market allows reaping almost risk free profits at the time of issue which, 
however, weakens long term incentives.  
To see this consider a set of assets held on the balance sheet, and producing a stream of profits 
stretched out over time. The very same set of assets securitized and sold in the market will earn the 
originator an almost risk-free first profit position. If he fully sells the FLP, then the originator is left 
with a position which is almost equivalent to a gain on sale. Thus, securitization allows to frontend-
load the transaction, while it would have produced more backend loaded profits if retained on the 
balance sheet.  
Provided that bank management is incentivized by some profit sharing bonus, we predict bank 
managers to be interested in asset securitization simply because it may increase their income with no 
commensurate risk premium imposed –  the risk in the form of increased default probabilities is 
mostly borne by shareholders and third parties in case of bank insolvency. In other words, the 
incentive to expand securitizations was upheld by the fact that the management payoff was cashed 
out as a bonus well before the externality was felt in the proftit/loss of the bank. In addition, profit 
sharing through bonus without malus invited a risk-increasing bank policy, since it allowed managers   42
to appropriate returns privately while the added risks were largely borne by shareholders and third 
parties. 
36 
Who, then, is to blame? We claim that, apart from the lack of a malus, internal accounting rules for 
deriving bonus-profits were not designed for the ‘hybrid’ world of modern banking that emerged 
over the past 10 years. To date, there is no explicit accounting recognition of future losses and risks 
in profits and losses. 
Thus, by marketing information-sensitive assets, financial intermediaries could realize and distribute 
profits that otherwise would accrue only later on, and only under favourable (‘normal’) 
circumstances. The preponement of earnings partially explains the enormous interest of investment 
bankers in these transactions – it also explains why such transactions simultaneously tended to 
undermine the real value of the underlying portfolios
37.  
If we now turn to the policy options, we will take our structural explanation of the crisis as the basic 
building block from which to derive the policy options. Since we see negative externalities at work, 
there is indeed a case for policy intervention. The aim shall be to internalize, to the extent possible, 
the externalities found in these markets. 
4.2. Securitization 2.0 
If we go back a few years, we encounter another financial crisis that has shaped our understanding 
of equity markets. Around the year 2000, the so-called dotcom bubble, a drastic fall in stock prices 
of mostly young technology firms, wiped out the wealth of many equity investors. Preceding the 
crisis was a long and enormous rise in market valuation for high-tech firms, which eventually proved 
to be unsustainable. Of particular importance in these markets were web-oriented business models. 
With hindsight we know that many of these firms did not have a sustainable business model.  
Only a few years later, the market is embracing a number of firms that are built on very similar web-
based business models. These successful firms are said to cope much better with the difficulties of 
generating earnings in the otherwise free, open-access internet. These amended business models are 
often subsumed under the heading “Web 2.0”, to indicate their advanced degree of sophistication 
(O’Reilly 2007). But in fact, the now-successful enterprises have profited from the dotcom bubble as 
an important learning experience.  
                                                 
36 Of course, a malus can be imposed by giving the manager a share in the terminal value. 
37 Ralf Ewert alluded us to the Enron-Woldcom cases which display quite similar features, notably concerning the use of 
earnings preponement, see Benston/Hartgraves (2002).    43
In quite a similar fashion we expect securitization to face a strong future – after having digested the 
lessons from the current credit crisis. This is why we look for the minimum government 
intervention required to assure these lessons to have an effect in the markets. Our recommendations 
fall into three broad categories, which we refer to as incentive-related, information-related, and 
market infrastructure-related.   
4.2.1 Retention and compensation  
a) Retention 
As we have explained in Section 3, the lack of public information about the status of incentive 
alignment along the securitization value chain is probably the single most important reason for the 
investor strike
38. This insight, however, does not imply that the arrangers should be forced to retain 
a certain fraction of the issue as suggested by the European Union. It does not even imply that the 
arranger ought to retain any part of the issue as long as investors know it.  
Rather, the analysis suggests that, for each issue, the market needs to know precisely who holds the 
first loss piece. Regardless of whether the investor is a monitoring specialist like the local 
commercial bank, or a banking amateur like a pension fund – once investors know the allocation of 
the first loss piece, they will be able to understand the risk implications. Thus, we claim that public 
information about incentive alignment by issuer will lead the market to sort it out, to establish 
different prices that reflect incentive alignment, or the lack thereof.  
Once prices reflect individual qualities, opacity is diminished, as is necessary for liquid asset markets. 
Of course, with transparency on first loss piece holdings, arrangers will internalize effects of selling 
the equity piece, and we predict that substantial first loss piece retention will be the model of choice 
whenever the underlying assets are highly information-sensitive
39.  
In practice, first loss piece retention alone will not be sufficient for ‘comprehensive incentive 
alignment’, as explained in Section 3.3.3. However, this information can be amended by a more 
comprehensive measure of incentive alignment throughout the securitization value chain. This 
statistic could be produced and continuously monitored by independent information providers, like 
auditing firms or rating agencies. Simultaneously, the market reaction to this information may be to 
induce the arranger to reshape the value chain so as to mitigate incentive problems. Thus, we may 
see some re-intermediation. 
                                                 
38 The term ‘investor strike’ refers to the refusal by private and institutional investors, and by banks, to buy securitization 
tranches.   
39 Information-sensitive in this context refers to underlying assets that are prone to adverse selection and moral hazard.    44
The important innovation of our suggestion is that public information on incentive alignment 
obtains the prominence in the market that it deserves – and that is completely absent in ABS 
markets today. We are confident that the industry will quickly develop reasonable standards how to 
take the incentive issue seriously into consideration. 
b) Compensation 
In Section 3 we have argued that frontend-loading in securitization transactions is the reason why 
performance-oriented remuneration generates perverse incentives. Here, perverse means: without 
proper regard to the implications for the longer-term quality of the underlying assets. Compensation 
systems provide strong incentives for transactions which allow for large gains on sale, for example, 
through first profit positions
40 
41. Risks imposed on others tend to be ignored. Moreover, the 
incentives of an annual bonus depend on bonus-profit accounting. If the profit in early years does 
not correctly anticipate losses and risks which may materialize in later periods only, then the present 
value of manager bonuses will be overstated. Finally, if the manager does not face a threat to risk 
taking through a malus, then we should not be surprised by very high bank leverage. 
If one looks for remedies against departures from incentive compatible backend loaded 
compensation, we do not see much room for the regulator. The only instrument available to 
encourage incentive harmonization is, once again, transparency. Let investors know how deals are 
compensated for, and they will learn how to sort out the major incentive problems. Furthermore, 
once the market differentiates between deals according to their incentive design, there will be a 
competitive pressure in the financial industry to install appropriate compensation systems.  
Once again, information providers like auditors and rating agencies are candidates for the task of 
producing information about compensation-related incentive alignment, regularly updating this 
information, and communicating it to the market. Rating agencies have demonstrated in the past 
that even coarse information systems,  like bond rating schemes can fulfil this task quite well.  
While we see a positive role for the regulator to get such a reporting system started, we see no role 
for him in the design of the compensation system.  
4.2.2 Accounting and rating 
                                                 
40 Also the accounting for retained tranches, in particular, the equity tranche, poses serious problems. These tranches are 
booked at fair values. Since there is no active market for these instruments, management has discretion to select a value. 
In effect, management can select, within certain boundaries, the size of the gain to be booked into the income statement, 
see for example Dechow/Myers/Shakespeare (2007) or Karaoglu (2005).  
 
41 There is some evidence in the empirical accounting literature that earnings management in gains-on-sale transactions is 
indeed an issue, see for instance Dechow/Shakespeare (2006).   45
In this subsection we discuss the information set required by the market to properly price structured 
financial instruments, like tranches in asset backed securities transactions. Prices should reflect the 
individual quality of the assets in order to avoid a pooling equilibrium, as we have witnessed 
throughout the past twelve months. In tune with what we have said in earlier sections in this paper, 
transparency in the market about complex products is deficient.  
The main deficiency is the complete absence of information on incentive alignment. Again, for asset 
pricing this seems to be a required piece of information. Some associations, like the European 
Securitization Forum, have recently started an initiative to improve information availability. In this 
case, ESF has started to set up a webpage containing all descriptive data from the offering circular, 
along with further statistical and qualitative information provided by the issuer of a particular 
transaction.  
While we appreciate the improved access to statistical data, particularly for research purposes, this is 
not the kind of transparency required to liquefy ABS markets. As we have argued in the subsection 
on transparency, the key providers of information to investors in these markets are rating agencies
42. 
These institutions have a strong record of judging default risk of corporate bonds, but they were not 
adequately prepared to handle asset backed securities. The potential failure to properly account in 
the rating process for misaligned incentives in the underlying transactions design necessitates 
clarification.  
Is regulation needed there? Yes, we see a positive role for regulation here, although perhaps very 
different from the policy recommendations vis-à-vis rating agencies we have seen to date. As 
explained above, we see the need for a separate report on the incentive status of ABS transactions, 
where the exact methodology still has to be developed. Agencies shall be free to develop their own 
methodology, just as they have done in the case of bond ratings. The rating process itself should 
therefore not be subject to regulatory oversight. What, however, a regulatory body could do is to 
take care of the measurement and publication of rating performance.  
Rating performance refers to the validity of ratings assignments, i.e. the accuracy with which the 
default probability is measuring the default likelihood. There is a set of common accuracy statistics. 
In theory, accuracy determines the economic value of agency ratings. Solid rating performance 
requires a precise and long-lived data base of assigned ratings and of observed defaults and an 
independent body analysing the data. This also includes the difficult task of reliably estimating 
default correlations in asset portfolios, or, even more complicated, copula parameters. Otherwise, 
                                                 
42 Rating information is widely known to be coarse and slow, but nevertheless relevant for remote investor. It is coarse 
and slow as it reports broad rating notches only, and does not provide continuous update.    46
tranching of portfolios cannot be viable. Today, investors rely on statistics produced by the agencies 
themselves, which may be biased due to conflicts of interest.  
4.2.3 Reducing opacity: differential capital charges and comprehensive exposure survey 
a) Differential capital charges  
While the previous recommendations addressed opacity in incentives and asset quality, the following 
recommendations address opacity in banks and risk exposure of the banking sector. Perhaps the 
most basic insight of our analysis is that bank managers have strong incentives to hide information 
on financial assets and on the risks of their institutions. This leads to opacity on the macro-level and 
impairs liquidity of asset markets and of the interbank market, i.e. it generates strong negative 
externalities. Capital regulation can be used to encourage financial institutions to increase 
transparency.  One way to achieve this is through capital charges that are inversely related to 
transparency, holding risk constant. Requiring banks to hold equity against opacity, in addition to 
holding capital against risk weighted assets, would be an innovation in capital regulation. It explicitly 
addresses incentive problems at the bank level through capital requirements. Note that such a 
regulatory extension need not imply an increase in overall capital charges. If, for example, an average 
capital charge of 8% is desired, the differential charges may range from 6% for wholly transparent, 
incentive-aligned banks to a charge of 10% for institutions with low transparency
43. Differential 
charges signal to banks that more transparency pays off, stabilizing financial stability at the same 
time. We have no recommendation how to construct an opacity index for banks. This is not an easy 
job similar to the problems encountered in improving bank risk reporting. 
b) Exposure survey 
Another issue of transparency which we did not address so far is sector specific information, in 
particular information on the exposure of the banking sector to specific risks. A single bank may be 
strongly exposed to some risks, but that would not endanger financial stability when these risks 
materialize. If, however, the banking sector is strongly exposed, then these risks may easily drain out 
the interbank market and destabilize the system. Therefore, sector specific information can act as an 
early warning system making banks more careful taking those risks
44. Central banks and supervisors 
should be able to map out the allocation and distribution of risk exposures in financial markets. This 
is clearly not the case today, and some research effort is needed to develop tools and concepts for 
drawing an international risk map. 
                                                 
43 How to determine the incentive alignment score is still an open question; we do not go into any details here. 
44 It might also have the opposite effect if bank managers prefer to herd.   47
In many ways, this is what the BIS did over the past few years. No doubt, their reports will become 
more recognized after this crisis, as BIS has pointed at the weak sides of the once-celebrated risk 
transfer market as early as 2005. A comprehensive risk reporting and communication task has to 
look at the large global financial institutions, including those entities that so far have managed to stay 
outside the reporting obligations demanded by regulatory bodies, like hedge funds, or institutions 
domiciled in offshore financial centers. The comprehensive risk survey we are envisaging is a regular 
rather than a continuous exercise, with the objective of becoming an early warning system for 
market participants and regulators alike.  
The early warning mechanism can be strengthened further by setting up an international credit 
register, aggregating liabilities on the debtor level, both nationally and internationally. If the scope of 
such a credit register is defined to encompass financial institutions as well, supervisors will have a 
data base to evaluate systemic risk for the first time
45.   
 
 
4.3 Summing up 
Building upon our analysis of how misaligned incentives on the bank level can bring down the entire 
financial market, provided many banks use a similar lending and funding technology, we propose 
five regulatory measures. The objective is the restructuring of the now defunct asset and the 
interbank market. These five rules of greater transparency and soundness are: 
First, transparency with respect to tranche allocation in ABS transactions, especially concerning 
equity pieces, is required for all transactions.  
Second, transparency about the use of frontend and backend loaded compensation systems, 
including a balance between bonus and malus components has to be achieved. For both 
transparency measures, a reporting methodology has to be developed, and rating agencies as well as 
auditors are seen as adequate intermediaries to perform this task.  
Third, the information content of agency ratings for corporate bonds and for securitization tranches 
has to be validated by credible and independent institutions, such as supervisory bodies and auditors.  
                                                 
45 There may also be indirect measures of systemic risk, like the correlations of bank stock prices with a market index, as 
suggested in Haensel/Krahnen/Wilde (2006).    48
Fourth, we propose opacity-related capital charges, in addition to risk-related charges for regulating 
banks. Again, the metric for capturing degrees of opacity still has to be developed – but we are 
confident that this will be possible.  
Fifth, and last, risk exposures of financial institutions should be aggregated for reporting purposes 
across countries and over time, to convey a full picture of the sector exposure.  
These “Five Rules of Greater Transparency and Soundness” fall behind many of the ambitious 
regulatory proposals that are discussed in the public domain today, at least if the severity of 
proposals is considered. However, we believe that many of these proposals go beyond what is 
required, thereby possibly degrading market functionalities, since the proposals are often not backed 
by theory or empirical research. An example is the request of the European Parliament forcing 
banks to retain 10% flat of every securitized transaction. The German government went even 
further demanding 20% retention on all asset backed securitizations. However, forced retention 
cannot be derived from theory. Conversely, the X%-retention rule actually invites banks to bypass 
the intentions of the recourse by gaming the loss rate distribution. The economically correct 
conclusion would be to force banks to disclose their retention decision.  
In concluding we emphasize that there are currently two camps in the debate. One is stressing the 
hypothesis that the credit crisis we are witnessing is caused by an exogenous liquidity or solvency 
shock, with prices diverging from fundamental values, and limits-to-arbitrage arguments are 
employed to rationalize the enduring fall in price. In contrast, the second group in this debate claims 
that the credit crisis is all about incentives, or rather misaligned incentives and ensuing 
intransparency. Our paper clearly belongs to the second camp. Whatever the correct analysis, the 
legislator should wait for a better understanding of the credit crisis before taking significant 
regulatory action.    49
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 Appendix 
Managers have more decision parameters than just loan quality and leverage. They can effectively 
design loans to shift hazard rates from the early to the late years so as to mitigate the adverse effects 
of getting fired. One method is to extend loans in case of financial distress of the debtor so that the 
loan does not become delinquent or does not go into default. Alternatively, in the subprime crisis, 
many loans granted were sweetened with teaser rates. In the first one or two years, debtors are 
charged low interest rates and subsequently there is a strong step up in interest rates. The effect is 
not only to provide debtors some relief in the first periods, but also to shift the hazard rates of the 
loans from early to late years.  
Consider, for example, standard BB+-loans with a default probability of 10.7% over 7 years. The 
hazard rate of such loans is basically constant over the 7 years, about 1,6%. Hence the expected 
profit from granting such loans is almost constant over time. If the credit spread for these loans is 
3%, then the expected profit in the first year would be 3 - 1.6 * 0.6 = $2.04 million, in the last year 
2.04 * 0.984
6 = $1.85 million. Hence the expected profit declines only by 1.6% per year.  
Now consider loans with teaser rates such that in the first two years debtors only need to pay the 
risk free rate but later on there is an annual step up in the interest rate such that the average credit 
spread over the 7 years equals 3.15%. Hence the annual step up in the interest rate after the second 
year is 1.47%. Critical is how the teaser rates change the hazard rates. To simplify things, suppose 
that the hazard rate is 0.3% in the first two years, and then increases annually with 0.6% implying a 
cumulative probability of default over 7 years of 10.6%. This figure is slightly below the 10.7% in the 
standard case.  
Regarding manager incentives, it is critical how the annual profit for the bonus is determined. One 
possibility would be to derive in each year the profit as the earned credit spread minus default losses. 
But this would imply losses in the first two years because the credit spread is zero. The manager 
would presumably object to this bonus system. Therefore we look at a bonus system in which in 
each year the profit is defined as the average credit spread of 3.15% on non-defaulted loans minus 
default losses. Then the expected profit equals 3.15- 0.3 * 0.6 = $2.97 million in the first year and in 
the seventh year (1-PD6) * (3.15 - 3.3 0.6) = (1-0.0757) * (3.15 - 3.3 0.6) = $1.08 million.  
Relative to the standard BB+-portfolio the expected profit in the first year increases from 2.04 to 
$2.97 million. Hence the manager’s income-certainty equivalent in the first year increases by more 
than her participation rate times the difference in expected profits. In the last year, the expected 
profit declines from $1.85 to $1.08 million, in addition, the profit risk is much higher since the   55
hazard rate increases from 1.6 to 3.3%. Therefore, manager income-certainty equivalent in the last 
year declines by more than her participation rate times the difference in expected profits. As a 
consequence, with teaser rates the manager earns most of the bonus in the first years.  
This example serves to emphasize two aspects. First, the effects of the incentive system depend on 
the accounting rules for the bonus-profits. If, as in the example, profits are artificially shifted from 
the late to the early years, then this tends to shift manager income-certainty equivalents to the early 
years. For a medium-term oriented manager this creates an incentive to take more risk given 
nonnegative bonus payments only. It also postpones the danger of being fired once a certain level of 
default losses is realized. Second, given the bonus system, the effectiveness of the bonus system 
depends on manager policy. Often the manager has many different policy variables which enable her 
to undermine the effectiveness of the incentive system as intended by shareholders. 
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